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  JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF  
NATIONAL SECURITY: 
Executive Restrictions of Civil Liberties When 
“Fears and Prejudices Are Aroused” 
Tania Cruz1 
As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution 
that in times of war or declared military necessity our 
institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional 
guarantees . . . that in times of distress the shield of 
military necessity and national security must not be used 
to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and 
accountability . . . that in times of international hostility 
and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive 
and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority 
to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices 
that are so easily aroused. 
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after the Twin Towers collapsed before the world’s eyes, 
President George W. Bush declared to Americans that in the quest for 
justice, “we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in 
our world.”3  Despite those resounding words, the United States imme-
diately arrested 1,200 Arab and Muslim men with no direct links to 
terrorism.4  It also held secret deportation hearings in cases dubbed “special 
interest,”5 and designated American citizens “enemy combatants,” 
indefinitely detaining them absent fundamental liberties.6  Thus began 
America’s “war on terror.”7 
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In the war’s early stages, Americans watched as the nation’s leaders 
retaliated against those who devastated the country.  As the war on terror 
evolved, however, many executive actions appeared unrelated to protecting 
America’s people and institutions from another attack.  Rather, according to 
observers, those actions were integral to an executive plan to extend its 
power beyond constitutional boundaries under the mantle of national 
security.8  So began what some are calling the executive’s attack on civil 
liberties.9 
Central to this claimed constitutional excess is the executive’s concerted 
effort to abolish meaningful judicial review of its actions.  According to 
prominent retired federal judges and attorneys, this effort represents “one of 
the gravest threats to the rule of law, and to the liberty our Constitution 
enshrines, that the nation has ever faced.”10 
This article observes that during times of national security fears, the 
judiciary often embraces the executive’s arguments of minimal judicial 
review and fails to closely scrutinize government national security actions.  
Historically, this excessive judicial deference has led to numerous civil 
liberties disasters.11 
After September 11, 2001, through the use of newly created threshold 
security designations, the executive devised a method to effectively strip 
Americans of fundamental liberties.12  The executive argues that these 
threshold designations, including enemy combatant status, when coupled 
with a minimalist evidentiary standard, are immune from meaningful 
judicial review.13  The potential for a present day civil liberties disaster is 
therefore at hand. 
To ensure meaningful and independent review of executive restrictions 
that curtail civil liberties during times of national stress, this article 
contends that a rigorous framework of judicial review is warranted.  The 
article then offers a national security civil liberties framework of judicial 
review that applies heightened scrutiny to national security threshold 
designations and the evidence used to support such designations.14 
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As a foundation for this assertion, Section II of this article briefly 
examines Korematsu v. United States and the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure 
to engage in meaningful judicial review of Executive Order 9066 that led to 
the internment of 120,000 Japanese American citizens.15  To demonstrate 
the need for heightened judicial scrutiny, Section also discusses the 
subsequent coram nobis litigation that unearthed government documents 
proving that the executive order to intern Japanese Americans was in fact 
based on racial animus and not military necessity,16 thereby vindicating 
those the government interned.   
Section III studies the enemy combatant / indefinite detention cases.  The 
section begins by discussing the World War II case, Ex Parte Quirin,17 to 
demonstrate that the executive’s reliance on it as legal precedent is 
misplaced.  The section then examines the first two enemy combatant cases, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld18 and Padilla v. Bush,19 to illustrate the new form of 
deference some federal courts are giving the executive.  
Section IV will first assess the judiciary’s proper role during times of 
national fears and upheaval by examining judicial history and contrasting 
approaches to judicial review of executive actions.  The section will then 
offer a national security civil liberties framework of judicial review for 
analyzing contemporary executive actions that will prevent the unnecessary 
curtailment of civil liberties in the name of national security.  In doing so, 
Section IV will illustrate how the executive is using threshold designations 
and a highly deferential evidentiary standard to avert heightened judicial 
scrutiny of its substantive liberty deprivations.  Applying the proposed 
framework, the section will then demonstrate why heightened judicial 
review of the enemy combatant designation is appropriate and how it 
accommodates both national security concerns and civil liberties—as 
distinguished from deferential review and the imbalance it tolerates.   
Section V concludes the article discussing how the executive is at times 
subverting American fundamental liberties by using a newly developed 
analysis. 
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II.  NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW—LESSONS FROM 
KOREMATSU  
A.  Korematsu and the Japanese American Internment  
In 1942, the U.S. government convicted Fred Korematsu for refusing to 
obey its military wartime exclusion orders. These orders precipitated the 
mass internment of 120,000 Japanese Americans without individualized 
determinations that any of them posed a threat to national security.20  In its 
review of Executive Order 9066, which mandated the Japanese American 
exclusion leading to the internment, the U.S. Supreme Court in Korematsu 
v. United States began its opinion by stating that “all legal restrictions 
which curtail civil liberties of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect,” such that “courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”21  
Rather than review the government’s exclusion orders under “strict 
scrutiny,” however, the Court proceeded to do the opposite. 
The Court relied on Hirabayashi v. United States, an earlier decision that 
upheld the conviction of Gordon Hirabayashi, another Japanese American 
who had refused to obey a racial curfew order.22  Although the Supreme 
Court in Hirabayashi claimed that its holding was narrow and applied only 
to the curfew issue, the Korematsu Court later cited to Hirabayashi to 
justify Fred Korematsu’s conviction and, ultimately, the Japanese American 
internment.23 
The Court in Korematsu claimed it would strictly scrutinize Executive 
Order 9066, but it failed to review the order under even “rational basis.”  
Rather than providing a meaningful review of the factual record, the Court 
took judicial notice of all the government’s conclusions concerning racial 
stereotypes and the danger of espionage and sabotage that west coast 
Japanese Americans allegedly posed.24  Despite published rumors that the 
government shielded intelligence reports showing there was no threat of 
espionage or sabotage by Japanese Americans and that mass internment was 
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unnecessary, the U.S. Supreme Court simply took judicial notice of the 
falsified documents the government used to advance its position that 
Japanese Americans posed a threat to U.S. security.25   
B.  Reopening Korematsu:  The 1980s Coram Nobis Cases  
Years later, de-classified documents were obtained through Freedom of 
Information Act requests, revealing two extraordinary facts.  First, all of the 
government intelligence services investigating the so-called “Japanese 
Problem” on the west coast and allegations of Japanese American espionage 
and sabotage unequivocally informed the heads of the military and War and 
Justice Departments that the west coast Japanese, as a group, posed no 
national security danger, and there existed no need for mass exclusion.26  
Second, the War and Justice Departments deliberately misled a highly 
deferential Supreme Court about the ostensible “military necessity” basis of 
the Korematsu decision.27 
Based on this newly discovered information, on January 19, 1983, Fred 
Korematsu filed a Writ of Error of Coram Nobis.28  Korematsu sought to 
reopen his World War II case and vacate his forty year-old conviction.  On 
November 11, 1983, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, finding “manifest injustice,” 
granted the petition on the merits,29 ultimately determining that the War and 
Justice Departments during World War II had altered, suppressed, and 
destroyed key evidence that demonstrated the absence of military necessity 
for the mass racial internment.30 
The government’s misrepresentations to the Court in the original 
Korematsu case and the Court’s deferential acceptance of the government’s 
falsified position endorsed the mass incarceration of innocent people 
because of their race.  In accepting as fact the government’s assertion that 
Japanese Americans posed a threat to national security, “the Court not only 
legitimized the dislocation and imprisonment of loyal citizens without trial 
solely on account of race, but it also weakened a fundamental tenet of 
American democracy—government accountability for military control over 
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civilians.”31  The Court’s deference, despite its pronouncement of 
heightened scrutiny, has been sharply criticized as subverting civil liberties 
to falsified claims of national security.32  Thus, the coram nobis cases 
cogently demonstrate the imperative of applying heightened judicial 
scrutiny in cases where fundamental liberties are at stake. 
Almost sixty years after the Supreme Court’s now infamous Korematsu 
opinion, the executive is once again attempting to limit judicial review of 
fundamental liberty restrictions ostensibly justified by national security 
concerns.33  Many of its arguments mirror those offered in Korematsu—
national security threats and military necessity mandate extreme judicial 
deference to the executive branch.34  In fact, even the evidence used to 
justify current executive actions—a declaration by an unknown government 
official named Mobbs—resembles the DeWitt Report the Koremastu Court 
had relied on.35  However, rather than simply demanding absolute deference 
as in Korematsu, the executive has devised a new means to potentially 
shield its actions from judicial review.36 
III.  CIVIL LIBERTIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS UNDER ATTACK: THE 
HAMDI AND PADILLA ENEMY COMBATANT CASES  
In a deeply disturbing dimension of the war on terror, the executive has 
pursued American citizens and detained them indefinitely absent charges, 
access to counsel, habeas corpus proceedings, or trial, all on the 
government’s “say-so.”37  These executive actions call into serious question 
the executive’s power to unilaterally declare U.S. citizens enemy 
combatants. By labeling these citizens “enemy combatants,” a term used 
historically to classify offenders of the laws of war,38 the executive proffers 
that it can deny these individuals fundamental liberties during times of war 
and peace.39  According to the executive’s tortured logic, enemy combatants 
are not criminals who are guilty of wrongdoing.  This is precisely why the 
government can indefinitely detain them without habeas proceedings, the 
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Seventh Amendment right to a trial 
by jury, or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ right to due process.40 
For nearly two years, the executive has detained American citizens Yaser 
Esam Hamdi41 and Jose Padilla42 as enemy combatants.43  Challenges to 
their detention have fallen mainly on deaf ears as members of the federal 
judiciary have deferred almost entirely to the executive’s unilateral 
determination that these men are enemy combatants, a label that supposedly 
makes them ineligible for constitutional protection.44  Relying primarily on 
Ex Parte Quirin, a World War II German saboteur case that allowed U.S. 
enemy belligerents to be tried and punished by military tribunals even 
though the civil courts were open, the executive claims that the United 
States has a history of designating its citizens enemy combatants and 
detaining them indefinitely without charges.45  However, a closer reading of 
Ex Parte Quirin reveals that the executive’s reliance on this case is 
misplaced and that there exists no legal or historical precedent—outside of 
Korematsu—for the executive’s extraordinary actions.46 
A.  What is an Enemy Combatant 
In Ex Parte Quirin,47 eight German nationals and possibly one U.S. 
citizen originally from Germany were captured by the United States as they 
attempted to enter the country for purposes of “sabotage, espionage, hostile 
or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war.”48  The executive 
maintained that because they were not lawful combatants fighting for an 
enemy army, they could be tried before a military tribunal under the 
Articles of War.49  The eight petitioners challenged the government’s 
authority, arguing that under the U.S. Constitution, Art. III, § 2, and the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, they had a right to a jury trial at common law 
in the civil courts.50  Furthermore, they argued that under Ex Parte 
Milligan,51 they were entitled to a civil trial because the civil courts were 
open and functioning normally.52  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected these 
arguments, holding that petitioners were unlawful belligerents and that 
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under the Articles of War they were not entitled to be tried in civil 
proceedings or by jury.53  The Court also determined that trying the 
petitioners before a military tribunal did not violate the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments because they were not charged with “crimes” or involved in 
“criminal prosecutions.”54 
Quirin is notable for the proposition that the government can try U.S. 
citizens through military tribunals when they have violated the laws of war, 
notwithstanding that the civil courts are open.  Most recently, however, it 
has become significant for its use of the label “enemy combatant”—words 
not found in the American lexicon until now.55  In defining enemy 
combatant, the Quirin Court differentiated this new class of individuals 
from lawful combatants who are “subject to capture and detention as 
prisoners of war by opposing military forces.”56  Enemy combatants are 
thus unlawful combatants who, in addition to being subject to capture and 
detention, “are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts 
which render their belligerency unlawful.”57 
The spy . . . or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes 
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by 
destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents 
who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of 
prisoners, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial 
and punishment by military tribunals.58 
 Thus, Quirin stands for the proposition that the executive can deem a 
U.S. citizen an enemy combatant, and then attempt to punish him in a 
military court rather than in a civil court, which would provide a full range 
of procedural and constitutional protections.  It does not, however, stand for 
the “sweeping proposition”59 the executive is presently asserting—that it 
can unilaterally designate a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and then hold 
the individual without charges, access to counsel, habeas proceedings, trial, 
and judicial review.60  Quirin explicitly stated that enemy combatants must 
be charged and tried before they are punished.  In Quirin, the petitioners 
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had at least a rudimentary form of due process, unlike petitioners Hamdi 
and Padilla.61  
As discussed below, in the present enemy combatant cases, the executive 
does not seek to charge Hamdi or Padilla, let alone try or punish them based 
on their guilt.62  Although indefinite detention in solitary confinement, as 
Hamdi and Padilla are currently facing, is clearly a form of punishment, the 
executive explicitly states that these men are not criminals and argues that 
their detention is not punitive.63  Instead, the executive claims that the 
purpose of their indefinite—and possibly perpetual—detention64 is to 
prevent them from rejoining enemy forces or, at a minimum, to hold them 
pending further investigation.65   
Moreover, the executive claims that Quirin provides it with the legal 
precedent to take these actions.66  However, the executive’s reliance on 
Quirin is misplaced because the case stands only for a change in tribunal, 
not for indefinite detention.  Furthermore, Quirin does not stand for the 
proposition that the executive may detain American citizens 
incommunicado without access to counsel.  The defendants in Quirin were 
afforded counsel, and the Court clarified that enemy combatants have 
standing to contest convictions for war crimes by habeas proceedings.67 
Quirin arose in the context of World War II, providing little question 
about who the enemy was or whether the petitioners were in fact enemy 
combatants.  As the district court in Padilla recognized, the decision in 
Quirin turned not on whether the detainees were enemy combatants, but on 
whether enemy combatants—even if U.S. citizens—could be detained and 
tried by the military.68   
In the war on terror, where the United States is fighting an illusive and 
undeclared enemy, battle lines are hazy, making the executive’s power to 
label an American citizen as an enemy combatant especially broad.69  As 
numerous former and sitting federal judges and legal practitioners have 
recognized, it is the judiciary’s role to review the executive’s designation of 
Americans as enemy combatants, particularly since the executive’s 
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designation strips them of fundamental liberties, including freedom itself.70  
Even the deferential Quirin Court recognized that the courts’ duty “in time 
of war, as well as in time of peace, [is] to preserve unimpaired the 
constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.”71  As the following Hamdi and 
Padilla cases demonstrate, absent independent judicial review, the 
executive wields “far too broad power to imprison a citizen declared to be 
an ‘enemy’ of the state; [it is] power alarmingly akin to that routinely 
exercised by totalitarian governments over dissidents.”72 
B.  Hamdi: An American Captured on Foreign Soil 
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S. citizen born in St. Louis and raised in Saudi 
Arabia, was captured by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan and 
brought to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for detention.73  Upon discovering he 
was an American citizen, U.S. forces transferred him to the Norfolk Naval 
Station Brig.74  He has remained in government custody since April 2002.75  
Although Hamdi’s habeas petition76 acknowledged that Northern Alliance 
seized him in Afghanistan during a time of active military conflict, it also 
asserted that “as an American citizen . . . Hamdi enjoys the full protections 
of the Constitution,”77 and that the government’s current detention of him in 
this country without charges, access to a judicial trial, or to counsel 
“violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.”78 
On June 11, 2002, before the executive had an opportunity to respond to 
Hamdi’s petition, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
appointed Hamdi a public defender and ordered the executive to allow 
Hamdi unmonitored access to counsel.79  On July 12, 2002, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order allowing Hamdi 
access to counsel and castigated the lower court for not deferring to the 
executive in national security matters.80 
The executive also attempted to dismiss Hamdi’s petition on the merits, 
claiming it had the power to unilaterally declare any U.S. citizen an enemy 
combatant without judicial oversight.81  The Fourth Circuit, however, 
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denied the executive’s motion, stating its reluctance to “embrace [the] 
sweeping proposition . . . that with no meaningful review, any American 
citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely 
without charges or counsel on the government’s say-so.”82 
The Fourth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to 
determine Hamdi’s status.  In doing so, however, the court was pre-saging 
the outcome on remand by noting “that if Hamdi is indeed an ‘enemy 
combatant’ who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the 
executive’s present detention of him is a lawful one.”83 
On remand, the district court proceeded to follow the Fourth Circuit’s 
instructions by attempting to determine whether the executive’s designation 
of Hamdi as an enemy combatant was in fact justified.84  As its sole support, 
the executive offered a two-page, nine-paragraph declaration written by 
Special Adviser Michael H. Mobbs.85  On August 13, 2002, in accordance 
with the Fourth Circuit’s instructions, district court Judge Doumar 
conducted a hearing focusing on the central issue of “whether the Mobbs 
Declaration, standing alone, was sufficient justification for a person born in 
the United States to be held without charges, incommunicado, in solitary 
confinement, without access to counsel on U.S. soil.”86  On August 16, 
2002, Judge Doumar issued an order finding that the Mobbs Declaration, 
standing alone, was insufficient to permit meaningful judicial review of 
Hamdi’s detention.87 
Most importantly, Judge Doumar carefully defined the appropriate 
judicial role in national security related cases: “a meaningful judicial review 
must at the minimum”88 determine if the government’s classification was 
determined pursuant to appropriate authority, the screening criteria used to 
make and maintain that classification is consistent with due process, and the 
basis of the continued detention serves national security.89  Based on its 
preliminary review, the district court found that the Mobbs Declaration fell 
“far short of even these minimum criteria for judicial review.”90  The 
district court arrived at this conclusion because the allegations in the Mobbs 
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Declaration were, in large part, drawn from hearsay supplied by relatively 
unknown members of Northern Alliance forces alleged to have acted as 
bounty hunters.91  Rather than exclude the Mobbs Declaration entirely, 
however, the court ordered the executive to produce complete copies of any 
other statements made by Hamdi in order to conduct a proper judicial 
review of his classification.92  The court noted that the Mobbs Declaration 
was “little more than the government’s ‘say so’ regarding the validity of 
Hamdi’s classification as an enemy combatant”93 and that by accepting it at 
face value, the court would be “abdicating any semblance of the most 
minimal level of judicial review . . . acting as little more than a rubber 
stamp.”94  
On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that the 
Mobbs Declaration standing alone was sufficient to sustain Hamdi’s 
indefinite detention as an enemy combatant and that Hamdi’s petition 
should be dismissed.  Even though Judge Wilkinson, writing for the Fourth 
Circuit, acknowledged that the hearsay-laden Mobbs Declaration could be 
challenged for inconsistency and incompleteness, he severely chastised the 
district court for not showing the government the proper level of deference: 
To be sure, a capable attorney could challenge the hearsay nature 
of the Mobbs declaration and probe each and every paragraph for 
incompleteness and inconsistency, as the district court attempted to 
do.  The court’s approach, however, had a single flaw.  We are not 
here dealing with a defendant who has been indicted on criminal 
charges in the exercise of the executive’s law enforcement 
powers.95 
Judge Wilkinson, somewhat disingenuously, criticized Judge Doumar for 
indicating that he was “challenging everything in the Mobbs Declaration 
and that he intended to ‘pick it apart’ ‘piece by piece.’”96  In fact, the 
district court did as the Fourth Circuit had instructed.  It considered “the 
sufficiency of the Mobbs declaration as an independent matter before 
proceeding further.”97  And, although the Fourth Circuit maintained that 
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“the detention of U.S. citizens must be subject to judicial review,”98 those 
words appeared to be little more than lip service since the court deferred 
entirely to the executive’s determination that Hamdi was in fact an enemy 
combatant, asking for no further evidence.  The Fourth Circuit instead relied 
on the unprecedented “zone of active combat” test in finding that the 
executive’s decision to detain Hamdi indefinitely as an enemy combatant 
was constitutional. 
Because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of 
active military combat in a foreign theater of conflict . . . the 
submitted declaration is sufficient basis upon which to conclude 
that the commander in chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi 
pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him in the United States 
Constitution.99 
In sum, the Fourth Circuit ruled that when the executive branch asserts it 
has seized an American citizen in a zone of active combat, that citizen 
might not challenge or otherwise dispute those assertions.  Thus, the 
executive can indefinitely incarcerate a U.S. citizen even though an official 
with no personal knowledge of the underlying facts made the assertions 
supporting the detention.100  
The Fourth Circuit did not ascertain how the U.S. military determined 
that Hamdi was allied with enemy forces or the sufficiency of the Mobbs 
Declaration standing alone, although it had previously instructed the district 
court to make the determination.  Instead, the court boldly concluded that 
“the factual averments in the affidavits, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm 
Hamdi’s detention,”101 without considering whether the factual averments 
were indeed accurate.  In fact, the court declined completely to evaluate the 
accuracy of the factual averments. 
In support of its contention that no further factual inquiry was necessary, 
the executive advocated that courts apply the highly deferential “some 
evidence” standard in evaluating habeas petitions in “areas where the 
executive has primary authority.”102  Recognizing that the “standard has 
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indeed been employed in contexts less constitutionally sensitive than the 
present one,”103 the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the deferential some 
evidence standard because it deemed any factual inquiry into the Mobbs 
Declaration unnecessary.  The Court stated, “It is not necessary for us to 
decide whether the ‘some evidence’ standard is the correct one to be applied 
in this case because we are persuaded for other reasons that a factual inquiry 
into the circumstances of Hamdi’s capture would be inappropriate.”104 
In denying Hamdi the right to counsel and his request for habeas relief, 
the Fourth Circuit clarified that its holding was narrow and limited to 
Hamdi’s situation because he was captured in a zone of active combat in a 
foreign theater of war.105  Replete with deferential language, the court cited 
several times to the government’s war-making powers, explaining that 
“delving into Hamdi’s status and capture would require [the court] to step 
so far out of its role . . . that [it] would abandon the distinctive deference 
that animates this area of law.”106  Referring to the then pending Padilla 
case, the court asserted that it would not proclaim “any broad or categorical 
holdings on enemy combatant designation”107 and would not “address the 
designation as an enemy combatant of an American citizen captured on 
American soil or the role counsel might play in such a proceeding.”108  
Hamdi sought rehearing by the original panel or in the alternative 
rehearing en banc.109  By a ruling of eight to four, the Fourth Circuit denied 
rehearing.110  In her dissenting opinion, Judge Motz sharply criticized Judge 
Wilkinson and the original panel for “abrogat[ing] . . . constitutional rights” 
in declaring Hamdi an enemy combatant based solely on “a short hearsay 
declaration by Michael Mobbs—an unelected, otherwise unknown, 
government ‘advisor.’”111   
Despite the executive’s apparent lack of evidentiary support, Judge 
Wilkinson fittingly observed that the judiciary has traditionally afforded the 
executive great deference when it makes decisions in the theater of war.112  
However, what if the executive captures an American citizen on U.S. soil, 
completely outside the theater of war, where there are no hindrances to 
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collecting evidence or impracticalities to making officials justify their 
actions?  In that case, should the executive be afforded unlimited deference 
in claiming that any U.S. citizen, regardless of where, when, and how he 
was captured is an enemy combatant and is therefore ineligible for 
constitutional protections?  Federal courts are currently addressing this 
question in the ongoing Padilla case. 
C.  Padilla: An American Captured on U.S. Soil 
Jose Padilla, a U.S. born Puerto Rican American who converted to Islam, 
was arrested at the Chicago airport in May 2002 as a “material witness” in 
an investigation related to September 11.113  Following his removal on May 
15, 2002, from Chicago to New York, he appeared before the district court, 
which appointed him counsel.114  Following a conference on May 22, 2002, 
with his attorney, Donna Newman, Padilla moved to vacate his material 
witness warrant.115  On June 9, 2002, the government notified the court ex 
parte that it was withdrawing the subpoena, and the court vacated the 
warrant.116  The executive then immediately designated Padilla an enemy 
combatant, took custody of him, and transferred him to a South Carolina 
prison where he was no longer permitted to speak to his counsel.117  
Although the executive informed his counsel that she could write to Padilla, 
it indicated that he might not receive the correspondence.118 
Immediately after designating Padilla an enemy combatant, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed 
publicly that Padilla had planned to steal radioactive material within the 
United States to build and detonate a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty 
bomb,” on U.S. soil.119 In support of its contention, the executive once 
again offered only a conclusory seven paragraph Mobbs Declaration 
contending that Padilla is “closely associated with Al Qaeda,”120 engaged in 
“hostile and war-like acts,”121 including “preparation for acts of 
international terrorism”122 directed at this country.123  
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On June 11, 2002, through his “next friend” Donna Newman, Padilla 
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.124  The executive moved to dismiss Padilla’s habeas 
petition on jurisdictional grounds.  First, the executive asserted that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction because Donna Newman did not qualify as 
a next friend.125  Second, the executive contended that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction over the case because no proper respondent with custody 
over Padilla was present within the court’s jurisdiction.126  The habeas 
petition named President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Attorney 
General Ashcroft, and Commander M.A. Marr as respondents.  According 
to the executive, Commander Marr, the commanding officer in the Naval 
Brig in South Carolina where Padilla was being detained, was the only 
proper respondent.127  Thus, the executive argued that only the South 
Carolina district court had habeas jurisdiction.128  In response to the court’s 
request that the parties submit additional briefing on the issues of 
petitioner’s right to counsel, the executive contended that Padilla did not 
have the right to consult with counsel because he was being held as enemy 
combatant pursuant to the laws and customs of war, rather than as a 
criminal.129 
On December 4, 2002, Judge Mukasey granted Padilla limited access to 
counsel to present facts in support of the habeas petition.  The court began 
its opinion by holding that Donna Newman had standing to bring the habeas 
petition on Padilla’s behalf.130  Next, the court addressed who the proper 
respondent was.  Finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over President 
Bush and Commander Marr, the court dismissed the petition against 
them.131  However, the court found that Secretary Rumsfeld was the proper 
respondent and that the district court had jurisdiction over him.132  Finally, 
the court concluded that because Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman, was in 
New York and had begun working to secure his release before the executive 
removed Padilla to South Carolina, it would not transfer the case to South 
Carolina.133 
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In addressing the substantive merits of the case, the district court 
reviewed whether the executive had the power to designate a U.S. citizen 
captured on American soil as an enemy combatant, detain him without 
access to counsel, and withhold trial for the duration of the war on terror.  
Relying primarily on a strained reading of Quirin, the district court ruled 
that the President has the unilateral power to designate American citizens 
enemy combatants.134  The district court, however, never addressed the 
issue of whether Padilla was indeed an enemy combatant.  Instead, the court 
took great lengths to explain that the executive receives due deference in its 
war making capacity.  The court failed to acknowledge that Padilla’s case 
falls outside the executive’s express war powers, because government 
officials did not apprehend Padilla in a zone of active combat, and he is an 
American citizen initially detained as a material witness on U.S. soil.135 
The court conceded that no “lush and vibrant jurisprudence”136 exists 
governing whether an enemy combatant can be held indefinitely, agreeing 
that Quirin really does not offer the “proper precedential value for the 
government’s determination.”137  To justify its deference in light of this 
admission, the court instead relied on Justice Jackson’s words regarding 
deference to the executive.138 This was the same justice who, in his ringing 
dissent in Korematsu, warned that the majority’s opinion stood as a “loaded 
weapon” to be used at a later time “for the hand of any authority that can 
bring forward a plausible claim of urgent need.”139 
1.  The “Some Evidence” Standard 
Although the district court ultimately allowed Padilla access to counsel, 
the ruling was so narrow that it amounted to little more than a pretense.140  
In Padilla, the court granted Padilla access to counsel for the limited 
purpose of presenting facts to the court regarding his habeas petition.141  On 
its face, it appears the court was not excessively deferential to the executive, 
which argued that the court should deny Padilla access to counsel entirely.  
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Upon closer examination, however, to defer is precisely what the court 
chose to do. 
Judge Mukasey stated that Padilla’s access to counsel would be limited 
solely to presenting facts to the court.142  Rather than basing his ruling on 
the broad Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Judge Mukasey granted access 
to counsel narrowly based on the All Writs Act,143 which “permits a court to 
which a § 2241 [habeas] petition is addressed to appoint counsel for 
petitioner if the court determines that ‘interests of justice so require.’”144  
This statutory, rather than constitutional, ruling excluded Padilla from using 
counsel to conduct discovery, cross-examine witnesses, and meaningfully 
rebut the executive’s testimony.145  Coupled with the new “some evidence” 
standard for establishing the executive’s enemy combatant designation, the 
ruling assured that the habeas proceedings would be little more than a show.   
In Padilla, the executive argued that courts should review its enemy 
combatant designation under the highly deferential and improperly applied 
some evidence standard.146  Although earlier the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi 
had declined to adopt it, finding no necessity for further factual inquiry,147 
the district court in Padilla did adopt the standard. 
The deferential some evidence standard is an administrative agency 
tribunal standard inapplicable to first impression judicial proceedings, 
because it “presupposes there has been some underlying adversarial hearing 
at which a record was created . . .”148 and procedural due process afforded.  
Civil and criminal proceedings for pretrial detention in which the 
government is presenting its initial case apply, at a minimum, the “clear and 
convincing standard.” 
Courts have traditionally applied the some evidence standard in 
reviewing prison disciplinary proceedings and immigration hearings after 
due process has been afforded.149  The purpose of the standard is to ensure 
that there is some evidence to support a factual determination that the 
executive has not arbitrarily deprived a person of liberty.150  Because courts 
have applied the some evidence standard following adversarial proceedings, 
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they have found it unnecessary to examine the entire record to ensure that 
the deprivations of liberty are not arbitrary.151  Thus, according to Supreme 
Court precedent, the some evidence standard “does not require examination 
of the entire record, independent assessment of witnesses’ credibility, or 
weighing of the evidence . . .”152 
Under the some evidence standard, courts will permit exculpatory 
evidence to determine whether the executive has met the standard, but only 
if such evidence directly undermines the reliability of the executive’s 
evidence.153  In the present case, Padilla would only have the opportunity to 
present evidence that undermines the executive’s Mobbs Declaration.154 
The some evidence standard that the executive advocates is analogous to 
the “scintilla of evidence” standard formerly used to defeat summary 
judgment motions.  By using the scintilla of evidence standard, the smallest 
amount of evidence in opposition to the motion was sufficient to defeat it.155  
Commentators severely criticized that standard because it predetermined 
that summary judgment motions would be continually denied.156 
Likewise, in the enemy combatant cases, the executive can virtually 
always meet the some evidence standard.157  The Mobbs Declaration 
supporting the executive’s assertion that a U.S. citizen is an enemy 
combatant is some evidence and sufficient to withstand judicial review 
under the new evidentiary standard, since the court is not scrutinizing the 
facts contained in the declaration for accuracy.158  Masquerading as 
meaningful judicial review, the some evidence standard the executive 
advocates “would eviscerate the concept of independent judicial 
scrutiny.”159 
Careful analysis of the district court’s language in Padilla indicates that 
Padilla’s access to counsel for presenting facts in the habeas proceeding was 
essentially a façade.160  The court had already predetermined that the 
executive’s designation of him as an enemy combatant would withstand 
judicial review.  By eliminating and manipulating procedural safeguards, 
the court prevented Padilla from effectively developing and presenting his 
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ongoing case.  Most important, the district court predetermined that the 
executive would prevail through the invocation of a practically nonexistent 
standard.  The court disingenuously granted Padilla limited access to 
counsel to present facts in a case where it had already decided that Padilla 
would lose.  It did so in order to appear as though it was weighing the facts 
and not deferring to the executive entirely.  Nevertheless, although the 
court’s adoption of the some evidence standard assured the executive’s 
victory in Padilla, the executive’s subsequent overreaching cost it one of its 
most ardent allies. 
2.  Motion for Reconsideration 
Despite Judge Mukasey’s indication that the executive would prevail, on 
January 9, 2003, the executive filed an untimely motion for reconsideration 
of the district court’s order to allow Padilla limited access to counsel.161  
Although the court ultimately granted the motion for reconsideration in 
order to hear the executive’s recycled arguments, it adhered to its previous 
ruling, writing a new opinion to chastise the executive for its duplicitous 
procedural maneuvering.162 
Ordinarily, motions for reconsideration are pro forma and dispensed with 
quickly by the courts.  Nevertheless, the executive’s procedurally and 
substantively flawed motion for reconsideration and Judge Mukasey’s 
strident response warrant discussion.163  Local Civil Rule 6.2, applicable to 
motions for reconsideration, requires that “such motion be made within ten 
days after determination of the original motion, and bars affidavits unless 
authorized by the court.”164  The executive, however, filed its motion more 
than one month after the original opinion and included the Jacoby 
Declaration—an affidavit without the benefit of court order.165 
Attacking the executive’s legal justification for filing an untimely motion 
for reconsideration, Judge Mukasey, who earlier appeared solicitous toward 
the executive, asserted that “[t]he government’s arguments . . . are 
permeated with the pinched legalism one usually encounters from non-
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lawyers.”166  Most important, Judge Mukasey’s opinion addressed the 
executive’s duplicity in ostensibly justifying Padilla’s continued detention 
without counsel.  In an inappropriate attempt to add to the record, the 
executive submitted the Jacoby Declaration, implicitly conceding to the 
insufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration.167  The Jacoby Declaration, 
produced by an Admiral Jacoby, asserted that the court should not grant 
Padilla access to counsel because the interrogators had created an 
atmosphere of dependency and trust and access to counsel could disrupt that 
relationship.168  Criticizing the highly speculative nature of the 
declaration,169 Judge Mukasey highlighted the executive’s failure to provide 
any facts or examples to justify the assertions.170 
Judge Mukasey then addressed the executive’s argument that the district 
court’s earlier adoption of the some evidence standard “moots any 
requirement in the [habeas] statute that Padilla be heard.”171  According to 
the executive, the some evidence standard requires courts only to consider 
the facts known by the President, as set forth in the Mobbs Declaration, at 
the time he designated Padilla an enemy combatant.172  The executive 
maintained that any factual showing Padilla could produce (regardless of 
whether it unequivocally proved that the executive’s designation of him is 
incorrect) is “beside the point.”173   
Even under the highly deferential some evidence standard, Judge 
Mukasey maintained that he could not prohibit Padilla from presenting facts 
to the court.174  Presentation of facts was necessary to confirm that Padilla 
had not been arbitrarily detained.175  Furthermore, application of the some 
evidence standard requires that Padilla be given an opportunity to respond 
to the executive’s allegations because there had been no prior adversarial 
proceedings allowing Padilla the opportunity to present his case.  Judge 
Mukasey stated, “No court of which I am aware has applied the ‘some 
evidence’ standard to a record that consists solely of the government’s 
evidence, to which the government’s adversary has not been permitted to 
respond.”176 
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In important respects, Judge Mukasey’s statements about Padilla’s need 
and right to present evidence represent less than they initially appear.  The 
court indicated that its earlier ruling allowing Padilla access to counsel to 
present facts to the court was a “pro forma requirement”177 to avoid the 
appearance that it had dispensed with due process entirely.  Coupled with 
the court’s adoption of the some evidence standard, Judge Mukasey 
suggested throughout the opinion that he had already predetermined the 
executive would prevail in the habeas proceedings.178  The court therefore 
admonished the executive for its overreaching in not allowing the court to 
satisfy its pro forma due process requirement without affecting the ultimate 
result.179 
In its analysis of the precedent supporting the some evidence standard, 
the court concluded that earlier prison disciplinary cases made it practicable 
for petitioners to obtain exculpatory evidence against the government.180  
Given the sensitive nature of Padilla’s case, however, the court suggested 
that it would be more deferential to the executive in reviewing Padilla’s 
evidence than past courts applying the some evidence standard had been: 
Those cases which dealt with evaluation of evidence gathered in 
the relatively accessible setting of a prison, cannot be applied 
mechanically to evaluate evidence gathered in the chaotic and less 
accessible setting of a distant battlefield.  What allowances will 
have to be made in the logic of those cases will have to abide 
whatever submission Padilla may choose to make.181 
Thus, only by allowing Padilla access to counsel under a some evidence 
standard could it appear that the district court had not abdicated its judicial 
role while still allowing the executive to prevail. 
3.  Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
In response to Judge Mukasey’s reaffirmation that the executive grant 
Padilla limited access to counsel, the executive filed a motion for 
interlocutory appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.182  The 
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executive, however, did not ask the court to certify questions regarding the 
executive branch’s authority to designate U.S. citizens as enemy combatants 
or the propriety of the some evidence standard.  Rather, the executive only 
challenged the district court’s initial ruling that Secretary Rumsfeld was the 
proper respondent, and that the New York district court had jurisdiction to 
hear the case.183 
The executive’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction appears to have been 
part of its larger legal strategy to remove Padilla from the Second Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.  The record suggests the executive feared that the Second 
Circuit, one of the more liberal circuits in the country, might rule that the 
executive does not have the authority to unilaterally designate an American 
citizen detained on U.S. soil an enemy combatant, or at a minimum that the 
executive must produce more than some evidence to support the 
designation.184 
Since the Fourth Circuit exhibited extreme deference to the executive in 
Hamdi, adjudicating Padilla in conservative South Carolina, where Fourth 
Circuit law controls, might prove strategically advantageous.  Thus, the 
district court’s decision in South Carolina would most likely be in the 
executive’s favor and on appeal, the case would go to the Fourth Circuit.  
Given that court’s earlier reluctance to award Hamdi access to counsel, the 
likelihood is that the Fourth Circuit would deny Padilla access as well, 
notwithstanding its previous reluctance to proclaim any “broad or 
categorical holdings.”185 
Judge Mukasey’s order certifying the interlocutory appeal strongly 
suggested that he understood and disagreed with the executive’s legal 
strategy.186  In addition to certifying the two procedural questions the 
executive submitted, Judge Mukasey certified sua sponte three substantive 
questions: (1) whether the President has the authority to label American 
citizens enemy combatants; (2) whether some evidence is the proper 
evidentiary standard in assessing the designation; and (3) whether the 
district court’s decision to grant Padilla limited access to counsel under the 
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All Writs Act was proper.187  Thus, the executive’s failure to adhere to 
Judge Mukasey’s initial ruling led to exactly what it appears the executive 
was attempting to avoid—adjudication of the substantive merits by the 
more liberal Second Circuit.  At the same time, the executive succeeded in 
bringing before the federal appellate court a highly deferential, if not 
predeterminative, standard of judicial review of executive pronouncements 
of national security.188 
IV.  FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY 
RESTRICTIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES 
As a means of defeating or (perhaps more aptly stated) avoiding 
heightened scrutiny of actions that curtail civil liberties, the executive has 
devised an artifice for extreme judicial deference.  Using threshold 
designations and a deferential evidentiary standard, the executive is 
assuring that when courts reach the substantive issue—for example, 
whether the executive has the authority to label an American citizen an 
enemy combatant—the level of scrutiny is so low that the judiciary is 
rubber-stamping the executive determination.189  Employing this novel 
method ensures that courts will not exercise close judicial review and 
permits the executive to further expand its power.  Moreover, this method 
of designation creates a safe haven; insulating courts from the type of 
criticism the U.S. Supreme Court received after its World War II Japanese 
American internment decisions where it pronounced strict scrutiny yet gave 
extreme judicial deference to government excesses. 
In light of the executive’s demand that courts defer to its national security 
assertions, the following section will examine the judiciary’s historical role 
in reviewing executive policy during times of ostensible national security 
threats.  The existing tensions, as to the level of judicial scrutiny courts 
should apply to assert national security restrictions of fundamental liberties, 
will also be explored.  This section will then analyze a particular method for 
selecting the appropriate standard of judicial review in the context of 
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national security and civil liberty tensions.  Using this method as a 
foundation, the section will then offer a preliminary framework for courts to 
apply in current national security civil liberties cases, particularly those that 
employ threshold designations and procedural maneuvers in an attempt to 
evade judicial review and public accountability.  To demonstrate how the 
framework would treat executive designations like enemy combatant, the 
section will conclude by applying the framework to Hamdi and Padilla.  
A.  The Judiciary’s Historical Role in Reviewing Executive Policy During 
Times of National Security Threats 
Lurking beneath the surface of nearly every war powers and national 
security decision is the question of what role, if any, the judiciary should 
have in adjudging executive actions that restrict civil liberties.190  When the 
executive advances arguments for minimal judicial scrutiny of its national 
security measures, it is in essence saying that its constitutional liberty 
restrictions warrant special deference because they are being undertaken 
during exceptional circumstances.  Conceding that although its actions 
would not normally pass constitutional muster, the executive asserts that the 
courts should ultimately legitimize its actions when there is a bona fide 
threat to the nation’s security.191 
The judiciary’s competence in scrutinizing national security claims has 
long been debated.  Two prevalent views have emerged to address the 
federal judiciary’s role during times of national threat.  The “interventionist 
view” contends that in a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is best 
positioned to safeguard constitutionally protected liberties from the tyranny 
of the majority because it is insulated from the pressure of political 
constituencies.192  Since federal judges are appointed for life, they are free 
to render decisions based on the law, rather than on the whims of the public.  
According to the interventionist view, the judiciary provides “watchful 
care” over the rights of individuals,193 particularly during times of national 
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threat or crisis when “fears and prejudices”194 are aroused and the system of 
democracy is at its most vulnerable.195   
The opposing “non-interventionist view” holds that decisions affecting 
the liberties of individuals should be left to the majoritarian and politically 
accountable executive and congressional branches.196  Implicit is the notion 
that the judiciary should pay substantial deference to the executive and 
congressional branches—particularly when their actions arise in the context 
of national security threats.197  Under this rationale, the judiciary’s role is to 
uphold the laws of the land, rather than take an active part in shaping 
them.198  Broadly stated, if the executive or legislature oversteps the bounds 
of its power, an informed electorate is later capable of checking government 
excesses through the political process.199 
For the political process to work, however, government actions must be 
open for the American people to scrutinize.  But what happens when the 
American people do not know what their government is doing?  If the 
government has shrouded its actions from the public, how then can the 
public provide the “ultimate check against an arbitrary government?”200  In 
light of the recurring history of executive branch civil liberties abuses 
during times of national stress,201 the question then emerges: when, not if, 
the judiciary should intervene to protect fundamental liberties from 
government actions in times of ostensible national security threats?  
In practice, when a citizen’s fundamental liberties are at stake, some 
courts have applied a heightened scrutiny analysis to determine whether the 
government’s self-protective measures are legitimate.  The court first 
examines whether a bona fide threat to national security exists.202  If this 
inquiry yields a positive answer, then the analysis turns to determining 
whether the government’s means of securing the nation are the most 
carefully tailored.203  The determination is essentially factual and commonly 
left to the realm of the courts.  However, some legal scholars, including 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, argue that while the strict scrutiny analysis is 
appropriate during times of peace, the judiciary should defer to the 
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executive and legislative branches and attenuate the standard of review 
during times of national security threat.204  These scholars contend that 
during times of national crisis, there is sensitive information that the 
judiciary, and thus, the public, should not be privy to for the sake of the 
nation’s security.205  In response, other scholars reason that courts must 
ensure that the government has compelling legal justification for its actions.  
They point to the government’s historical misuse of national security 
arguments to deprive specific groups of fundamental liberties in cases like 
Korematsu.206 
B.  Ascertaining the Standard of Review in National Security Civil Liberties 
Cases 
To help resolve the debate of whether courts should apply heightened or 
deferential scrutiny to national security civil liberty restrictions, in 1986 
Professor Eric Yamamoto proposed a method for courts to determine the 
appropriate standard of judicial review.207  Professor Yamamoto suggested, 
“Except as to actions under civilly-declared martial law, the standard of 
review of government restrictions of civil liberties of Americans [should] 
not [be] altered or attenuated by the government’s contention that ‘military 
necessity’ or ‘national security’ justifies the challenged restrictions.”208  
Rather than deferring to the government’s national security assertions where 
fundamental liberties are restricted, Professor Yamamoto advocated that 
courts look at the government’s substantive claim and apply the heightened 
standard of judicial review prescribed by ordinary constitutional doctrine 
for non-national security cases.   
While contending that the government’s national security claims should 
not attenuate judicial review,209 Yamamoto recognized that national security 
concerns would indeed be important “ingredients in the application of the 
fixed constitutional calculus.”210  For example, if the Korematsu court had 
employed Professor Yamamoto’s method, it would not have merely 
pronounced strict scrutiny as the general standard to review the racial 
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incarceration and then deferred to the government’s specific claim of 
national security.  Instead, the court would have strictly scrutinized the 
government’s claim of Japanese American disloyalty, carefully examining 
the factual basis for the claim, including the substantially falsified DeWitt 
Report offered in support.211  If the government had declared martial law, 
which it did not, or if fundamental liberties had not been implicated, which 
they were, then the court would have been correct in fully deferring to the 
government’s military necessity claim as it did. 
C.  Critiquing and Expanding the Method  
Professor Yamamoto’s proposed method for determining the standard of 
judicial review in national security cases appears workable in cases like 
Korematsu, where the government grounded racial incarceration on 
substantive claims of unlawful conduct—espionage and sabotage.  The 
method, however, did not contemplate apparent executive attempts to evade 
heightened judicial scrutiny by using threshold designations, like enemy 
combatant, and inapplicable evidentiary standards, like the some evidence 
standard.  Broadly applied, Professor Yamamoto’s method would not treat 
the enemy combatant threshold designation as implicating a fundamental 
liberty because that designation is preliminary to any chargeable substantive 
claim of, for example, espionage, or sabotage.  Strict scrutiny would not be 
triggered until the substantive claim is raised, even though the ultimate 
effect of the executive’s preliminary designation would be an impingement 
on fundamental rights.  Professor Yamamoto’s standard also presumed that 
courts would review executive evidence under the proper evidentiary 
standard.  Therefore, his proposed method, which provides apt guidance in 
many situations, requires expansion to accommodate new developments 
such as the executive’s use of threshold designations and inapplicable, 
highly deferential evidentiary standards.   
Given the current ambiguity and the number of cases challenging 
executive actions arising out of America’s “war on terror,”212 numerous 
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judges and legal practitioners have observed that a workable framework of 
judicial review is needed.213  The following section suggests a two-tiered 
framework for reviewing national security civil liberty restrictions, 
particularly those that employ a “threshold designation method” to avert 
heightened judicial scrutiny.  More specifically, the first tier builds upon 
Professor Yamamoto’s approach for determining the appropriate level of 
judicial scrutiny by examining whether, according to law and facts, 
heightened judicial scrutiny of executive national security civil liberty 
restrictions is appropriate.  Where heightened judicial scrutiny is appro-
priate, the second tier articulates the executive’s burden of evidentiary 
proof. 
1.  The “Threshold Designation Method” for Averting Heightened 
Judicial Scrutiny 
In response to scholars’ and historians’ harsh criticism of the Court’s 
duplicity in Korematsu,214 the executive has devised a novel method to 
escape judicial review.  The executive has created new threshold desig-
nations—such as “enemy combatant,” “material witness,” and “special 
interest”—that precede substantive determinations and are immune from 
heightened judicial scrutiny when applied by the executive for national 
security reasons.  As prominent federal judges have recognized, the 
executive has devised a method “to do indirectly what it cannot do 
directly.”215 
A threshold designation appears to differ from an explicit racial directive, 
such as the military internment orders in Korematsu.  The designation also 
appears to serve process goals in the interest of national security, such as 
holding potential terrorists pending investigation or shielding sensitive 
national security information from the public eye.216  The executive, 
therefore, contends that courts should not scrutinize a preliminary and 
discretionary designation because the executive has not yet made the 
substantive determination as to whether the person is actually dangerous; 
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for example, whether an “enemy combatant” is actually engaged in terrorist 
activity.217  Yet, by making the threshold designation, the executive is in 
fact depriving the designated individual of fundamental liberties and is 
treating him as “guilty” of disloyalty. 
When the government labels a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant, it is in 
essence stripping the individual of all constitutional rights.  For example, if 
the government charged Hamdi or Padilla as a criminal, certain fundamental 
liberties would be implicated.  The individuals would have a Sixth 
Amendment right to confer with counsel in an unmonitored setting.  In 
addition to presenting facts to a court, access to counsel includes conducting 
discovery, knowing the evidence, having the ability to rebut the evidence, 
and cross-examining witnesses.  The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
clause would also apply, requiring adequate protection to ensure 
government interrogation conforms to the dictates of the privilege.218  Most 
important, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would apply, 
forbidding the government from depriving any American of life, liberty, or 
property “without due process of law.”219 
By designating U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, however, important 
constitutional liberties are rendered moot.  As currently applied, the 
designation does not mean that U.S. citizens will receive even a scaled 
down version of these liberties as Quirin suggested.  It means that they will 
not receive them at all.  They will not be criminally charged because, 
according to the executive, they are not criminals.220  They will not be tried 
because the purpose of their enemy combatant designation is not to punish 
or deter them, but rather to prevent them from rejoining the enemy pending 
investigation, even though there is no proof they are allied with the 
enemy.221  Stripped of fundamental liberties, they will be held indefinitely 
in legal limbo until the executive decides it no longer wants to hold them.  
Coupled with the highly deferential some evidence standard the executive is 
advocating, meaningful judicial review is eviscerated.222  Absent any 
meaningful judicial review, what then would stop the government from 
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designating, for example, all Arab Americans in an area as enemy 
combatants, and thereby stripping them of civil liberties?  The government 
could create de facto a new internment, once again shielded from judicial 
review. 
2.  Proposed National Security Civil Liberties Framework of Judicial 
Review 
In order to account for the executive’s attempt to subterfuge heightened 
scrutiny, the following section provides a preliminary sketch for a two-
tiered framework of judicial review of national security civil liberties 
restrictions that would first scrutinize the executive’s threshold designation, 
then closely examine the executive’s evidentiary proof. 
Under the first tier of the framework, judicial review would focus on the 
executive’s preliminary threshold designation to determine its implications.  
For example, when the executive designates a U.S. citizen an enemy 
combatant, heightened judicial scrutiny would be triggered where it appears 
that the designation results in depriving the individual of fundamental 
liberties, such as the lack of a hearing or access to counsel.223  Next, courts 
would look to legal precedent to determine whether, as a matter of law, the 
executive has the authority to label U.S. citizens enemy combatants and to 
deprive them of specific fundamental liberties, such as access to counsel 
and habeas procedings during exigent circumstances.224  If so, courts would 
apply heightened scrutiny to determine whether current circumstances 
warrant similar extreme measures and whether the means are appropriately 
tailored.225 
If the executive’s national security civil liberty restriction withstood the 
first level of judicial scrutiny, courts would proceed to the second tier of 
analysis that focuses on the burden of proof the executive must meet in 
order to deprive the individual of fundamental liberties.  Given the often 
complex nature of the legal system, the analysis presupposes that the 
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individual would have access to counsel to assist in the presentation of 
evidence.   
In the second level of analysis, the designated individual would be 
apprised of the executive’s evidence against him.  In addition, the individual 
could conduct discovery and cross-examine the executive’s witnesses.  
Courts would then examine the evidence the executive offers to sustain its 
designation of the individual, such as the Mobbs Declaration, alongside the 
individual’s evidence.  When warranted by seemingly legitimate national 
security concerns, courts could review executive evidence under seal or in 
camera.  In addition, parties to the litigation could be subject to carefully 
tailored gag orders.   
Next, to the extent practicable, courts would assess the reliability of both 
the executive’s and the individual’s evidence.  Assessing the reliability of 
the evidence would include focusing on the means either party used to 
obtain it, whether the evidence is hearsay, and if so, allowing challenges to 
the reliability through witness testimony, or if unavailable, through 
affidavit.  Then, courts would hear full arguments by both sides.  Finally, in 
light of the liberty interests at stake, courts would review the evidence, at a 
minimum, under a clear and convincing standard.226 
This proposed framework of judicial review advocates a significantly 
higher level of judicial scrutiny than that applied by Judge Wilkinson in 
Hamdi or Judge Mukasey in Padilla.  Despite the executive’s ostensible 
claims of a national security threat, the substantial deprivation of American 
liberty and imminent harm to the Constitution warrants nothing less.   
3.  The Threshold Designation Method in Other Situations 
The threshold designation method is not limited to enemy combatants.  
The executive has utilized the method in other national security situations to 
abolish or severely limit judicial review.  For example, of the 1,200 Arab 
and Muslim noncitizens detained post-September 11, many were initially 
held as material witnesses pending criminal investigations of others 
Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 161 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003 
involved in the attacks.227  The executive, however, used the material 
witness statute for another purpose—as a threshold discretionary 
designation to detain noncitizens, without evidence of wrongdoing, while 
investigating those particular individuals.  The executive was not actually 
holding these individuals so they could testify in ongoing criminal 
proceedings as statutorily required.228  Because the executive did not 
criminally charge the individuals, the threshold material witness designation 
was shielded from judicial scrutiny; the executive implied it was simply 
holding the aliens in order to secure their possible testimony about terrorism 
and was not punishing them for in fact being terrorists.229  
In actuality, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) first 
detained noncitizens as material witnesses on improper grounds pending its 
terror investigation of those individuals.230  The INS then used the detention 
to uncover minor immigration violations and initiate often secret 
deportation proceedings unconnected to terrorism.231  According to a 
Human Rights Watch report, “many of the detainees were never required to 
testify in court proceedings, their depositions were not sought to secure 
their testimony, raising serious doubts about the legitimacy of the 
government’s assertions that they were held as material witnesses.”232 
The executive utilized the material witness threshold designation to avoid 
judicial scrutiny of its blanket detention of noncitizens while it investigated 
them, even though the executive lacked evidence connecting them to 
terrorism.233  The executive resorted to this subterfuge, it appears, because 
the USA PATRIOT Act requires the government to charge detained 
noncitizens with criminal wrongdoing within seven days or release them.234  
Yet, by detaining noncitizens as material witnesses, ostensibly to secure 
their possible testimony in grand jury proceedings, the executive 
circumvented legislative safeguards that prohibit indefinite detention of 
noncitizens absent criminal charges.  The outcome of this executive 
maneuver was first detention and then, upon finding no connection to 
terrorist activity, deportation for minor immigration violations adjudicated 
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in secret “special interest” proceedings.  The cumulative effect was the 
misuse of the material witness designation to excise unwanted groups of 
individuals from the country.235  
As with enemy combatants, by not charging material witness detainees 
with a crime, the executive could assert that constitutional liberties were not 
implicated and that courts should therefore avoid closely scrutinizing the 
threshold designation.  But the ultimate effect of the threshold material 
witness designation was to deprive the individual of fundamental liberties—
often through prolonged detention under horrendous prison conditions 
without probable cause, charges, or trial.236  Under these circumstances, and 
consistent with the national security civil liberties framework of judicial 
review, future courts should exercise heightened scrutiny of threshold 
material witness designations to prevent the illegitimate deprivation of 
fundamental liberties.237 
In a variation of the threshold designation method, the executive closed 
deportation hearings of Arabs and Muslims it contended were “suspected 
terrorists” en masse, limiting judicial review by designating the cases 
“special interest.”238  By denying noncitizens the fundamental right to open 
proceedings in the absence of individualized determinations that they posed 
national security threats, the designation created a presumption of the 
noncitizens’ guilt.239  Furthermore, this blanket closing injured the public 
because potential government malfeasance was shielded from account-
ability.240 
Despite over one hundred years of open proceedings, INS regulations, 
and numerous court rulings recognizing a presumption of openness, the 
executive contended that there is no history of open deportation proceedings 
and therefore no First Amendment right of public access.241  The effect of 
applying the executive’s method was that courts would review whether the 
executive could close deportation hearings en masse by labeling them 
“special interest” under rational basis analysis, thereby assuring the 
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executive’s victory in most cases, and shielding its actions from public 
accountability.242 
Although the fundamental liberty implicated differs from the enemy 
combatant and material witness examples, the method is essentially the 
same.  In using the threshold designation special interest to close depor-
tation proceedings, the effect was to limit judicial scrutiny by attenuating 
the standard of review.  Although designating a case as special interest did 
not directly affect the substantive outcome of whether the alien was 
deportable, closing public access allowed the executive to secretly, and 
perhaps wrongfully, target individuals for deportation absent judicial review 
and public accountability.  As the Sixth Circuit in Detroit Free Press 
recognized: 
There seems to be no limit to the Government’s argument. . . . By 
the simple assertion of ‘national security,’ the Government seeks a 
process where it may, without review, designate certain classes of 
cases as ‘special interest’ and, behind closed doors, adjudicate the 
merits of these cases to deprive noncitizens of their fundamental 
liberties.243 
In applying the proposed framework of judicial review to assure the 
proper balance between national security and civil liberties concerns, courts 
would first scrutinize the threshold special interest designation.  If the effect 
were to deprive the noncitizen or the press on the public’s behalf of 
fundamental liberties, then courts would review the executive’s rationale 
and supporting evidence for the threshold designation under heightened 
scrutiny to determine if the national security interests are genuine and 
compelling, and if the restrictions are appropriately tailored. 
Meaningful review when a fundamental liberty is at stake will not only 
prevent the politically powerless from being swept up in the tide of public 
opinion, but it will also assure that the judiciary is not rubber-stamping 
executive actions.244  It will guarantee that the system of checks and 
balances functions properly and that any one branch is not gaining 
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excessive power.245  The courts’ role would not be expanded, because 
heightened scrutiny would only be applied in the same situations that it is 
applied today.  If the situation in the country becomes so ominous that the 
government must truly restrict civil liberties in the name of national 
security, as Professor Yamamoto has suggested, then it can declare martial 
law.246 
By maintaining heightened review absent martial law, targeted 
individuals and the public are assured that the threat the government is 
asserting is real and imminent.  By delineating the standard courts will 
apply to government actions ostensibly justified by national security, the 
executive and the legislature will know the bounds of their power and what 
type of justification is demanded when enacting laws to combat threats to 
the nation’s safety.  Americans will be on notice as to exactly what rights 
they have during times of perceived crisis.  Given that current courts are 
applying conflicting standards of judicial and evidentiary review when 
scrutinizing national security cases,247 courts will have workable guiding 
principles in determining how much deference to give the political branches 
when adjudicating cases that restrict our most fundamental of liberties.  
Finally, clear standards will decrease inconsistent district and circuit court 
rulings and ultimately provide predictability within the legal system.   
By recognizing that national security assertions are “ingredients in the 
constitutional calculus,”248 the judiciary will not likely undermine legitimate 
executive efforts to safeguard the nation’s institutions.  Rather than 
disregard such assertions, the judiciary will carefully examine the basis for 
the executive’s position and meaningfully review the evidence it offers to 
substantiate it.  Using judicially accepted methods with due concern for 
confidentiality, such as reviewing executive evidence in camera, courts can 
decipher whether executive assertions are warranted.249  Courts would 
neither be involved in military and foreign policy decisions nor would they 
be assessing the execution of America’s war on terror.  They would merely 
be assuring that when “troublesome times arise” and our “rulers . . . seek by 
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sharp and decisive means to accomplish ends deemed just and proper . . . 
that the principles of constitutional liberty” are not in peril.250  By not giving 
the executive carte blanche in such matters, courts are assured that there is 
in fact justification for the executive’s position.  Most important, courts are 
assured that they are not repeating the same mistakes of the Korematsu 
Court.251 
D.  Expanded Framework Applied:  Hamdi and Padilla 
This section applies the national security civil liberties framework of 
judicial review to specific national security cases.  As stated above, the 
framework applies two tiers of analysis.252  In the first tier of analysis, for 
example, courts would examine the executive’s enemy combatant threshold 
designation.  If the designation’s effect was to deprive the individual of 
fundamental liberties, heightened judicial scrutiny would be triggered and 
courts would then turn to applicable legal precedent to determine whether, 
as a matter of law, the executive has the authority to designate U.S. citizens 
as enemy combatants.  If courts determined that the executive does have 
such authority, then courts would review the executive’s use of the enemy 
combatant designation within the current national security context to 
determine if the security interest is genuine and compelling and the means 
are appropriately tailored.   
If the executive’s enemy combatant designation withstood the first level 
of heightened review, courts would proceed to the second tier.  In this level, 
the analysis would focus on the executive’s evidentiary burden in 
designating specific individuals as enemy combatants.  The executive 
would be required to produce the evidence it relied upon in making its 
determination, which the designated individual would be entitled to 
meaningfully rebut.  Courts would hear full legal arguments from both sides 
and would review all the evidence under a clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard. 
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1.  First Tier of Analysis 
In applying the national security civil liberties framework to Hamdi and 
Padilla, the first step is to examine the enemy combatant designation itself.  
What are its implications?  Does the threshold designation itself signifi-
cantly restrict fundamental liberties?  Does the designation appear to be an 
artifice for avoiding heightened judicial scrutiny on the ostensible grounds 
that the ultimate government action is still pending?  In Hamdi and Padilla, 
the implication of the executive’s threshold enemy combatant designation 
of the defendants is indefinite detention, absent fundamental liberties, 
pending investigation to determine substantive wrongdoing.  Once 
designated enemy combatants, Hamdi and Padilla lost the rights to counsel, 
trial, and judicial review.  However, the executive maintained that because 
they were not yet charged as criminals, they had no fundamental liberties, 
and heightened judicial scrutiny should not apply.  
In applying the framework, the executive’s denial of their criminal status 
is not determinative, because the framework requires courts to look at the 
effect the enemy combatant designation has on the individual.  Calling 
Hamdi or Padilla criminals or enemy combatants is irrelevant to whether 
courts should apply heightened judicial scrutiny, since the effect of the 
executive’s threshold enemy combatant designation is to incarcerate them 
indefinitely, in solitary confinement, and without access to counsel.  
Therefore, being labeled an enemy combatant becomes worse than being 
charged as a criminal.  According to the executive, the latter has far more 
rights than an enemy combatant.  Furthermore, by contending that these 
individuals are allied with Al Qaeda and that the purpose of their detention 
is to prevent them from rejoining the enemy, the executive has in reality 
concluded that they are, at a minimum, guilty of supporting a terrorist 
organization.  In the present cases, fundamental liberties are implicated, 
notwithstanding that Hamdi and Padilla are not charged as criminals.  Thus, 
heightened judicial scrutiny is triggered to determine whether, as a matter of 
law, the executive has the authority to detain Hamdi or Padilla.  
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The framework then looks to legal precedent to determine whether courts 
have historically permitted similar deprivation of liberties in other exigent 
circumstances.  Today, the executive cites primarily to the World War II 
case Quirin, which first employed the term enemy combatant, as its primary 
source of authority for indefinitely detaining Hamdi and Padilla and 
depriving them of fundamental liberties.  As previously discussed, however, 
Quirin does not stand for the proposition that the executive can unilaterally 
declare a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant and then indefinitely detain the 
individual without charges, access to counsel or judicial review.253  In 
Quirin, there was no question that the designated individuals were indeed 
enemy combatants.  Therefore, the case did not hold that the executive 
could unilaterally label a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant.  To the contrary, 
the high court recognized that even in times of war judicial scrutiny is 
necessary.  Finally, the enemy combatants had access to counsel, were 
charged, tried, and convicted before they were punished.  Thus, Quirin 
stands solely for the proposition that the executive can try a U.S. citizen as 
an enemy combatant in a military tribunal, notwithstanding that the civil 
courts are open.  Even District Judge Mukasey in Padilla recognized that 
Quirin does not offer the “proper precedential value for the government’s 
determination.”254  
Applying the first tier of the framework to the executive’s enemy 
combatant designation, therefore, reveals that the effect of the threshold 
designation is to deprive the individual of fundamental liberties, 
notwithstanding that the individual is not charged as a criminal or terrorist.  
If no other supporting legal precedent exists, the enemy combatant 
designation fails as a matter of law.  However, should courts discover legal 
precedent to support the designation, the framework requires courts to 
review the executive’s rationale under heightened judicial scrutiny.  Courts 
will thereby determine the legitimacy of the asserted national security 
justification for designating U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.  Next, 
courts would consider whether the executive’s means are the most 
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appropriately tailored means to accomplish its purpose.  In assessing the 
legitimacy of the designation, as District Judge Doumar established in 
Hamdi, courts must scrutinize factors such as the executive’s basis for 
designating the individual an enemy combatant, the screening criteria used, 
and the national security purpose the individual’s continued detention 
serves.255 
2.  Second Tier of Analysis 
If the executive’s enemy combatant designation withstood the first tier, 
courts would proceed to the second tier of analysis.  In this level, the focus 
shifts to the designated individual, who would be afforded full access to 
counsel.  Courts would also permit Hamdi and Padilla to present evidence 
to counter the Mobbs Declaration.  In addition to presenting facts, Hamdi 
and Padilla would be permitted to conduct discovery in order to 
meaningfully rebut the executive’s evidence.   
Next, to the extent practicable, courts would assess the reliability of the 
executive’s evidence alongside Hamdi and Padilla’s evidence.  Courts 
would begin by addressing the hearsay-laden nature of the Mobbs 
Declaration.  The executive would be required to respond to claims, such as 
that Special Adviser Mobbs lacked personal knowledge in producing the 
Mobbs Declaration.  In Hamdi’s case, the courts would focus on the 
allegations that Northern Alliance forces, responsible for Hamdi’s alleged 
capture, were paid bounties to capture Taliban prisoners and that many of 
the prisoners the Northern Alliance forces captured were wrongfully 
accused.256  In Padilla’s case, courts would focus on the apparent incon-
sistencies between Secretary Rumsfeld’s initial statements, in which he 
accused Padilla of being a terrorist with plans to detonate a “dirty bomb,” 
and subsequent reports by the Deputy Secretary of Defense that “there 
wasn’t really a plan.”257   
In addition, courts would consider allegations by the executive that 
Padilla is being detained solely for interrogation purposes and to prevent 
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him from rejoining the enemy.  Hamdi and Padilla would be permitted to 
present witnesses to rebut the executive’s Mobbs Declaration, as well as 
cross-examine the executive’s witnesses.  Courts would review evidence 
from both sides, under seal or in camera, if necessary, including the 
sufficiency of the Mobbs Declaration, standing alone, as justification for 
designating an American citizen an enemy combatant.  Finally, courts 
would hear full arguments on both sides and review the evidence, at a 
minimum, under a clear and convincing standard.   
In Hamdi and Padilla, the executive maintained that courts should review 
the threshold enemy combatant designation under the some evidence 
standard.  As previously discussed, the effect of adopting the some evidence 
standard is to guarantee the executive will prevail, because courts are not 
scrutinizing the executive’s supporting evidence to determine its probity.  
The framework would require courts to reject new and inapplicable 
evidentiary standards, such as the some evidence standard. 
Moreover, in applying the framework, courts would not apply a 
deferential zone of active combat test as the Fourth Circuit did in Hamdi, in 
lieu of meaningfully reviewing the executive’s supporting evidence.  The 
executive’s “national security” assertions would also not attenuate the 
standard of judicial review of the executive’s threshold designations and 
supporting evidence.  Were future courts to agree with Fourth Circuit Judge 
Wilkinson’s assertions in Hamdi that the executive’s national security 
decisions are accorded full deference, and therefore immune from 
heightened scrutiny,258 the executive could assert national security as a 
justification at any time it wanted to speciously target individuals and 
“deprive [them] of fundamental liberties.”259  Assured that courts would 
defer, and its restrictions would withstand—or not undergo—judicial 
scrutiny, the executive could once again legally target groups on account of 
race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, or political opinion without 
accountability.  District Judge Doumar in Hamdi recognized this danger and 
the significance of meaningful judicial scrutiny. 
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While it is clear that the executive is entitled to deference 
regarding military designations of individuals, it is equally clear 
that the judiciary is entitled to a meaningful judicial review of 
those designations when they substantially infringe on the 
individual liberties, guaranteed by the United States Constitution, 
of American citizens. . . . The standard of judicial inquiry must 
also recognize that the concept of ‘national defense’ cannot be 
deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of [executive] 
power designed to promote such a goal.  Implicit in the term 
‘national defense’ is the notion of defending those values and 
ideals which sets this Nation apart. . . . It would indeed be ironic if, 
in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion 
of one of those liberties . . . which makes the defense of the nation 
worthwhile.”260 
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan observed that 
during times of commotion, “when passions of men are aroused and the 
restraints of law weakened,”261 rather than defer to claims of national 
security, the judiciary should intervene and provide “watchful care”262 over 
cherished constitutional liberties. 
The above analysis of Hamdi and Padilla, therefore, suggests that the 
executive’s sole evidence in support of its threshold designation of Hamdi 
and Padilla as enemy combatants, the conclusory Mobbs Declaration that 
relied primarily on hearsay, would be insufficient to support their indefinite 
detention absent further evidence and criminal charges.  Without additional 
proof to justify their continued detention as enemy combatants, the 
executive’s threshold enemy combatant designation of Hamdi and Padilla 
would fail according to the national security civil liberty framework of 
judicial review.263 
V.  CONCLUSION:  REFRAMING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY—NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
In Korematsu, the Supreme Court first pronounced that it would strictly 
scrutinize the Japanese American exclusion orders and then deferred 
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entirely to the government’s national security and military necessity 
assertions.  As a result, that Court has been severely criticized for its 
pronouncement of strict scrutiny in principle and for its extreme deference 
to governmental excesses in fact.264  To similar criticism of judicial 
hypocrisy, courts today are practicing a new form of deference. 
If the courts permit the executive to create labels that strip Americans of 
fundamental liberties, the courts would  be once again abdicating their role 
of “watchful care.”265  Executive threshold designations like enemy 
combatant, material witness, and special interest appear to be little more 
than a method for circumventing constitutional protections.  The 
designations also create a way for a potentially deferential judiciary to 
review excesses of executive power using standards that masquerade as 
meaningful judicial review but that actually predetermine executive success. 
By allowing the executive to deploy a new framework of analysis and by 
alluding to ostensible precedent to support the executive’s unilateral 
threshold designations, the judiciary would threaten to undermine the very 
liberty the war on terror seeks to protect.  This assault on the Constitution 
would have real and resounding impact as lives are ruined.  If the 
Constitution does not stand for the principle that the executive cannot, at its 
word, deprive individuals of their freedom, then the document Americans 
cherish means little. 
As the executive continues to expand its reach into the personal lives of 
all Americans, heightened judicial scrutiny is imperative.  For if the 
judiciary does not demand justification of current civil liberty restrictions, 
no branch of government will.  Today, the judiciary needs to be the final 
arbiter and protector of fundamental liberties of citizens and noncitizens 
alike.  If it abdicates this role, as it did in Korematsu, then the very 
democratic foundation of the country is at risk.  If the executive’s expansive 
authority over American civil liberties is not checked, the excesses of today 
will haunt us tomorrow. 
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The executive needs to explain its basis for detaining someone as an 
enemy combatant.266  It should explain what procedures it will employ to 
ensure that these detentions are consistent with “due process, American 
tradition and international law.”267  It should ensure that detainees have 
access to counsel and that whatever actions it takes when the civil courts are 
open are subject to careful judicial review.268 
As revealed in Section IV, the executive is seeking to avoid judicial 
review and therefore public accountability.  The national security civil 
liberties framework of judicial review, proposed here, demonstrates that in 
precisely these circumstances, it is the judiciary that must ensure executive 
adherence to constitutional standards.  Today, as in Korematsu, the judi-
ciary must intervene and “exercise authority to protect all citizens from the 
petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.”269 
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8, 2003, at A01 (examining bi-partisan criticism of various executive actions under the 
USA PATRIOT Act, including the FBI’s power to seek permission from secret federal 
courts to covertly inspect library records and creating a total information black out of 
numerous executive actions). 
10 Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. John Gibbons et al., at 1, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. 
Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y April 9, 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-2235 (2nd Cir. June 10, 
2003) [hereinafter Gibbons Brief]. 
11  Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945) 
(describing the internment cases as a civil liberties disaster). 
12 See Section IV(C)(1) infra. 
13 Id. 
14 See Section IV(C)(2) infra. 
15 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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16 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp.2d 1406 (N.D.Cal. 1984).  Korematsu was the 
lead coram nobis case.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) and 
Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985), were companion coram nobis 
cases.  The government documents supporting the coram nobis litigation were discovered 
jointly by Korematsu coram nobis legal team members Peter Irons and Aiko Herzig 
Yoshinaga, a researcher for the U.S. Congressional Commission on Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians (“CWRIC”).  See U.S. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION 
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, GPO (1982). 
17  317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
18 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). 
19 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
20 Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary 
Government Excess & Lax Judical Review: Time for a Better Accomodation of Nat’l 
Security Concerns & Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986). 
21 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added). 
22 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
23 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. 
24 Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 2. 
25 Id. 
26 Lieutenant Commander K.D. Ringle, “Report on Japanese Question,” at 3 ( Jan. 26, 
1942) (the “Japanese Problem” has been “magnified out of its true proportion . . . [and] 
should be handled on the basis of the individual regardless of citizenship, and not on a 
racial basis”). 
27 Id. 
28 A writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary writ that operates to correct fundamental 
errors and to prevent manifest injustice in completed criminal proceedings after the 
petitioner is no longer imprisoned.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970); see also United States 
v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (explaining it is the rough substantive equivalent of a 
writ of habeas corpus, which applies to petitioners still in custody). 
29 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417. 
30 Id. 
31 Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 3. 
32 See Rostow, supra note 11; Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and Military 
Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
175 (1945); M. WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1976); PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 16; ERIC K. 
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE RIGHTS AND REPARATION—LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001).  
33 See Section III, infra.  Furthermore, current political justifications for the Japanese 
American internment, predictions of a potential Arab American internment by a President 
Bush appointee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and public support for racial 
profiling reveal that a new group internment is possible.  See Niraj Warikoo, Arabs in 
U.S. Could Be Held, Official Warns Rights Unit Member Foresees Detainment, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, July 20, 2002, at http://www.freep.com/news/metro/civil20_20020720.htm 
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(describing Civil Rights Commissioner Peter Kirsanow’s prediction of a popular Arab 
American internment in the event of another World Trace Center-type attack). 
34 See Sections III(B) and III(C) infra; the executive has argued for great judicial 
deference in its enemy combatant cases.  “The government thus submits that we may not 
review at all its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant—that its 
determinations on this score are the first and final word.”  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 
278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).  “Because the President’s determination that Padilla is an 
enemy combatant of an American citizen as an enemy combatant represents a core 
exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority, that determination is entitled to great 
deference.  At most, the President’s determination can be reviewed to ensure the 
existence of ‘some evidence’ supporting it.”  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-2235 (2nd Cir. 
June 10, 2003). 
35 The “Mobbs Declaration,” prepared by Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, served as the government's determination of 
Padilla’s status.  An unclassified version of the Mobbs Declaration is available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702mobbs.pdf.  [hereinafter 
Unclassified Mobbs Decl.]  Similarly, for Hamdi, Mobbs also prepared a declaration, 
which served as the legal determination.  These declarations were the sole support the 
executive offered to sustain its indefinite detention of Hamdi and Padilla.  The 
declarations were based entirely on hearsay, and Mobbs has no first-hand knowledge of 
any of the facts contained in the declaration.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 
528 (E.D.Va. 2002).   
 Northern Alliance forces were the primary source government officials used in 
producing the declaration to support Hamdi’s detention.  Id. at 535.  The district court in 
Hamdi voiced concerns over the government’s use of the hearsay-laden Mobbs 
Declaration to support Hamdi’s indefinite detention.  Id. at 528.  According to reports, 
“Northern Alliance commanders could receive $5,000 for each Taliban prisoner and 
$20,000 for a[n] [al] Qaeda fighter.  As a result, bounty hunters rounded up any men who 
came near the battlegrounds and forced them to confess.”  See Jan McGirk, Fighting 
Terror, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2002, at A30.   
 In the Mobbs Declaration supporting Padilla’s detention, Mobbs admitted that some of 
the sources are of dubious credibility.  In citing interviews with two individuals, Mobbs 
explained the following: 
It is believed that these confidential sources have not been completely candid 
about their association with Al Qaeda and their terrorist activities.  Much of 
the information from these sources has, however, been corroborated and 
proven accurate and reliable.  Some information provided by sources remains 
uncorroborated and may be part of an effort to mislead or confuse U.S. 
officials.  One of the sources, for example, in a subsequent interview with a 
U.S. law enforcement official recanted some of the information that he has 
provided, but most of this information has been independently corroborated by 
other sources.  In addition, at the time of being interviews by U.S. officials, 
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one of the sources was being treated with various types of drugs to treat 
medical conditions. 
Unclassified Mobbs Decl., at ¶ 3, n.1 (emphasis added). 
36 See Section IV(C)(1) infra.  As a result of the executive and military orders resulting 
in the deprivation of Japanese Americans’ fundamental liberties in Korematsu, Congress 
passed 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) to ensure that the executive could never again detain 
American citizens under the mantle of national security and military necessity absent 
specific legislative authorization.  The statute states, “No citizen shall be detained by the 
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”  18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).  According 
to The Cato Institute et al.: 
   By this language, Congress made clear that henceforth, congressional silence 
should no longer be construed as acquiescence in unauthorized executive 
detentions.  Congress passed § 4001(a) to avoid exactly what has happened [in 
the enemy combatant cases]: statutorily groundless detention of . . . 
American[s] justified by the Executive’s talismanic invocation of the terms 
“enemy combatant” and “national security.” 
Brief of Amici Curiae The Cato Institute et al. at 4, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 
218 (S.D.N.Y 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-2235 (2nd Cir. June 10, 2003). 
 To justify its unconstitutional detention of Hamdi and Padilla despite the § 4001(a) 
restriction, the executive is currently contending that the “Authorization of Military 
Force” (“AUMF”) resolution passed after September 11, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001), and an appropriations statute for the Department of Defense, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 956(5) (2002), constitute congressional authorization for the indefinite detention of 
American citizens as enemy combatants.  Brief of Amici Curiae The Cato Institute et al. 
at 4, Padilla (No. 03-2235).  Although the author believes that based specifically on  
§ 4001(a), the executive branch likely lacks statutory authority to detain American 
citizens as enemy combatants, the issue is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses 
on the executive’s ostensible constitutional authority. 
37 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 (“with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen 
alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely without charges of 
counsel on the government’s say-so”). 
38 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942). 
39 See Section IV(A)(2) and (3) infra. 
40 Id. 
41 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460. 
42 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564.  
43 The enemy combatant designation is not limited to Hamdi and Padilla.  The executive 
also labeled “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh an enemy combatant.  United States 
v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (2002).  However, the executive charged Lindh, a 
white American, as a criminal, and Lindh received the full panoply of Constitutional 
protections, including the right to counsel and presentation of evidence.  Following 
capture and interrogation by U.S. forces, the executive charged Lindh in a ten count 
indictment alleging, inter alia, (1) conspiracy to murder nationals of the United States, 
including American military personnel and other government employees serving in 
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Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attacks; (2) conspiracy to provide 
material support to a foreign terrorist organization; (3) conspiracy to provide material 
support and resources to Al Qaeda; and (4) contributing service to Al Qaeda.  Lindh 
simply could not have a change in venue.  Id. at 547–48.   
 In addition, the executive has also labeled Qatari national Ali Saleh Kahalh al-Marri 
an enemy combatant, and according to reports, the executive is detaining him in the same 
South Carolina facilities where Hamdi and Padilla are held.  See Al Marri v. Bush, 274 F. 
Supp. 2d 1003, 1004 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (dismissing habeas petition for improper venue after 
criminal charges were dismissed and petitioner declared an enemy combatant and moved 
to South Carolina).  Furthermore, the numerous noncitizen prisoners the executive has 
detained at Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo Bay since the conflict in Afghanistan began have 
also been labeled enemy combatants and therefore ineligible for the protections of the 
Geneva Convention.  Editorial, Wronged at Guantanamo, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 
2003, at A14. 
 Indicating an intention to label additional American citizens enemy combatants, the 
executive has erected a special facility in South Carolina designed to hold citizens 
designated “enemy combatants.”  Jess Bravin, More Terror Suspects May Sit in Limbo, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at A4. 
44 On interlocutory appeal, Judge Wilkinson maintained that the Fourth Circuit had 
“already emphasized that the standard of review of enemy combatant detentions must be 
a deferential one when the detainee was captured abroad in a zone of combat operations.”  
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 471–72.  Similarly, Judge Mukasey explained that deference to the 
President “extends to military designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times 
of active hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle.”  
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 606; But see Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 535.  (Judge Doumar 
refused to “rubber-stamp” the executive’s enemy combatant designation of Hamdi and 
proceeded to strictly scrutinize the Mobb’s Declaration that the executive used to support 
its position); See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 373 (4th Cir. 2003), (rehearing 
en banc denied) (sharply criticizing the Fourth Circuit panel’s reasoning as “dizzingly 
circular” arguing the panel’s review of Hamdi’s case did not “constitute the ‘meaningful 
judicial review’ the panel promised”) (Motz, J., dissenting). 
45 See Part III(A) infra. 
46 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5.  (“Although the Executive will not cite it, the only 
precedent in this nation’s history for the prolonged detention of American citizens with 
so little due process is the discredited decision in Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.  Unless the 
courts are now to become rubber-stamps for executive overreaching, the government’s 
position must be rejected.”) 
47 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
48 Id. at 10. 
49 Id. at 11. 
50 Id. at 39. 
51 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that U.S. citizens cannot be tried in a 
military tribunal when the civil courts are open). 
52 Quirin, 317 U.S at 20. 
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53 Id. at 20. 
54 Id. at 19. 
55 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 16.  (“Before September 11, 2001, the phrase ‘enemy 
combatant’ appeared only in a handful of court decisions, none of which support the 
Executive’s refusal to grant Padilla access to counsel or to provide with a meaningful 
adversarial hearing on his status.”).  In cases where the government might be termed 
“enemy combatants,” defendants were provided with counsel.  Id. at 17, citing In re 
Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946) (defendant afforded access to counsel and permitted 
to present evidence at habeas trial in federal court) and In re Application of Yamashita, 
327 U.S. 1 (1946) (reaching the U.S. Supreme Court after overseas trial in which 
Yamashita was afforded six defense counsel).  As in Quirin, the individuals detained in 
these cases were afforded access to counsel and a formal hearing on the record.  Thus, 
none of these cases “remotely support the government’s position that [enemy 
combatants] may be detained indefinitely without access to counsel and without any sort 
of adversarial trial with the accoutrements of due process.”  Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, 
at 17. 
56 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 12. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 31. 
59 See Part IV(B) and (C) infra. 
60 See Section IV(A)(2) and (3) infra. 
61 See Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 17 (“The Quirin defendants were given lawyers, 
informed of the charges against them, and allowed to present evidence on their behalf at a 
formal hearing.  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court on habeas, the facts 
were longer in dispute.”). 
In fact the Supreme Court has never held that a person designated by the 
Executive as an enemy combatant cannot challenge that designation or that a 
court cannot require the Executive to substantiate it.  In the case on which the 
majority relies, Ex parte Quirin, the Court did not hold that for a violation of the 
laws of war, even an American citizen could be treated as an “enemy 
combatant” and held without the full array of Constitutional rights, but only 
because the citizen, after consultation with legal counsel, stipulated to the facts 
supporting the enemy combatant designation. 
Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 369–70 (Motz, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
62 In Hamdi, Judge Wilkinson explained, 
As an American citizen, Hamdi would be entitled to the due process 
protections normally found in the criminal justice system, including the right 
to meet with counsel, if he had been charged with a crime.  But as we have 
pointed out, Hamdi has not been charged with any crime.  He is being held as 
an enemy combatant pursuant to well-established laws and customs of war. 
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475.  Similarly, in Padilla, Judge Mukasey contended that Padilla’s 
detention is not punitive: 
Padilla is not being detained by the military in order to execute a civilian law, 
notwithstanding that his alleged conduct may in fact violate one or more such 
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laws.  He is being detained in order to interrogate him about the unlawful 
organization with which he is said to be affiliated and with which the military 
is in active conduct, and to prevent him from becoming reaffiliated with that 
organization. 
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589.  
63 Id.; Respondents’ Response to District Court’s October 21, 2002 Order at 2, Padilla v. 
Bush No. 02 Civ. 4445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Respondents’ Response] (“Padilla 
has no right to counsel because he is being detained solely as an enemy combatant during 
wartime, not for any criminal or other punitive purposes”). 
64 In a revealing memo to the Department of Defense, whose contents were leaked to 
USA Today, Secretary Rumsfeld conceded that winning the war on terror would be “a 
long, hard slog.”  American citizens are facing potentially lifetime detention without 
significant judicial review.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that these “enemy 
combatants” may remain in detention “for the duration of the conflict,” a conflict he 
defined as ending “when we feel that there are not effective global terrorist networks war 
on terrorism is therefore permanent functioning in the world.”  Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld 
Sees Need to Realign Military Fight Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A12. 
65 According to the executive,  
the detention of all enemy combatants in wartime, serves two critical purposes 
related to the conduct of war:  It prevents him [sic] from continuing to aid the 
enemy in executing attacks against the United States, and it assists the military 
in gathering the intelligence necessary to effectively execute the war.  
Accordingly, his detention is no sense “criminal,” and it has no penal 
consequences whatsoever. 
Respondent’s Response to the District Court’s October 21, 2002 Order, Padilla v. Bush at 
5-6 (Oct. 28, 2002) No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM) at 2-3 [hereinafter, Respondent’s 
Response].  Secretary Rumsfeld has stated, “we are not interested in punishing” them, but 
in “finding out” what they know.  Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 574. 
66 Respondent’s Response, supra note 65, at 13-14.; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468; Padilla, 
233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-95. 
67 See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that unlawful belligerents did not 
have a constitutional right to a civil trial by jury but instead could be tried in a military 
tribunal without a jury); Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 17; Respondents’ Response, 
supra note 65, at 13-14; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594-595. 
68 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607. 
69 Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 372.  According to dissenting Fourth Circuit Judge Motz: 
The ramifications of such a holding are chilling.  Pursuant to the panel’s 
decision, for example, any of the “embedded” American journalists covering 
the war in Iraq or any member of a humanitarian organization working in 
Afghanistan, could be imprisoned indefinitely without being charged with a 
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70 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 3 (“the federal courts must have meaningful authority 
to make an independent evaluation whether a person is properly being held”).  Brief of 
American Bar Ass’n at 12, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y 2003), 
appeal docketed, No. 03-2235 (2nd Cir. June 10, 2003) [hereininafter ABA Brief] (“these 
general principles of deference in a military setting should not prevent the court from 
engaging in meaningful review of the government’s decision to detain Padilla.”); Hamdi, 
337 F.3d at 375 (“Under our Constitution…it is the responsibility of the courts to ensure 
that American citizens are not deprived of liberty without due process of law, regardless 
of the personal belief of any individual judge concerning the integrity of the Executive”) 
(Motz, J., dissenting). 
71 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 6. 
72 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 3. 
73 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460. 
74 Id. 
75 Recent reports indicate that Hamdi has been moved from Norfolk, Virginia to a brig in 
Charleston, South Carolina where the government has apparently erected a facility to 
hold American citizens designated enemy combatants.  U.S. Man Caught with Taliban Is 
Moved to Brig, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at 16; Jess Bravin, More Terror Suspects 
May Sit in Limbo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at A4. 
76 Hamdi’s habeas petition was submitted by his father acting as “next friend.”  Hamdi, 
316 F.3d at 460. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  As this article was going to press, on December 2, 2003, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) announced that Mr. Hamdi will be allowed limited access to a lawyer 
subject to government-determined security restrictions.  DOD New Release No. 908-03, 
DOD Announces Detainee Allowed Access to Lawyer, (Dec. 2, 2003), at 
http://www.dod.gov/releases/2003/nr20031202-0717.html.  In its news release, the DOD 
stated that such access is not required by domestic or international law and should not be 
treated as precedent.  Id.  The policy regarding its decision is that the DOD will permit 
access to counsel by an enemy combatant who is a U.S. citizen and who is detained by 
DOD in the United States after DOD has determined that such access will not 
compromise the national security of the United States, and after DOD has completed 
intelligence collection from that detainee or has determined that such access will not 
interfere with intelligence collection from that detainee.  Id.  Despite DOD’s concession, 
it has not afforded Mr. Hamdi unfettered access to counsel or authorized his challenge to 
his enemy combatant designation.  The public defender seeking to represent Hamdi said 
he intends to press forward with the Supreme Court petition that calls for Hamdi to be 
allowed to contest his combatant designation.  Jerry Markon and Dan Eggen, U.S. Allows 
Lawyer for Citizen Held as “Enemy Combatant”: Reversal Comes on Eve of Court 
Filing, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at A1.  
 Although on its face the DOD’s decision to allow Hamdi conditional access to counsel 
suggests that the executive may be loosening its civil liberties restrictions, the move is 
more likely to be another “calculated gesture to help the administration shield its policies 
from critcism and reversal by the courts.”  Neil A. Lewis, Sudden Shift on Detainee, N.Y. 
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TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A1.  As the public awaits for the Supreme Court to decide 
whether it will accept Hamdi on certorari, the Court has already agreed to hear the 
Guantanamo Bay indefinite detention cases.  Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case of 
Detainees at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at A1.  Although the Supreme 
Court would only resolve the jurisdictional issue of whether the federal courts could hear 
such a challenge and not whether the detentions are constitutional, the Court’s decision 
“was an unmistakeable rebuff of the Bush administration’s insistence that the detainees’ 
status was a question ‘constitutionally committed to the executive branch’ and not the 
business of the federal courts, as Solicitor General Theodore Olsen argued.”  Id.  Within 
the same week that the executive announced it would grant Hamdi access to counsel, the 
executive declared that it would release approximately 100 detainees from the 
Guantanamo Bay prison—“a shift intended to strengthen the Bush administration’s 
contention that it is dealing with detainees in a fair and orderly way so that there is no 
need for judicial interference in national-security decisions, legal analysts say.”  Charlie 
Savage, Guantanamo Ruling Seen Triggering Shift in Policy on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2003, at A6.  The administration’s decisions come at a time when a number of its 
post–September 11 national security civil liberties restrictions are coming under severe 
attack.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently heard oral arguments in Padilla 
where two members of the three member panel sharply criticized the executive for its 
treatment of enemy combatants, and one judge noted that the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 “didn’t repeal the Constitution.”  Furthermore, on December 3, 
2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned part of a sweeping 1996 anti-terror 
law that prohibits financial assistance or “material support” to organizations the 
Department of State has classified as terrorist.  Humanitarian Law Project v. United 
States Department of Justice, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).  The 
Ninth Circuit held that it is unconstitutional to criminalize donations of “personnel” or 
“training” that fall under the “material support” section of the law because it “blurs the 
line” on protected free speech. Id. at 60-63.  The ruling is a blow to the executive’s 
primary strategy to prosecute individuals it claims are suspected terrorists. Eric Lichtblau, 
Court Casts Doubt on Parts of Antiterrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003,  at A1.  
The executive thus appears to be softening its position in Hamdi in another attempt to 
evade meaningful judical review of its national security civil liberties restrictions by 
offering last minute concessions to critics of its anti-civil liberties stance. 
79 See Order at 2, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (E.D.Va. June 11, 2002) No. 2-02ev.439.  (the 
U.S. District Court appointed Public Defender Frank Dunham as Hamdi’s counsel).  
80 Id. at 279.  Even though Quirin allowed enemy combatants access to counsel, the 
Fourth Circuit did not address this issue, observing simply that the government is 
accorded due deference when making decisions in its war making capacity.  Id. 
81 Id.  In its brief to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the government asserted that 
“given the constitutionally limited role of the courts in reviewing military decisions, 
courts may not second-guess the military’s determination that an individual is an enemy 
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84 Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 535. 
85 See Unclassified Mobbs Decl., supra note 35. 
86 Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 530.  Judge Doumar carefully scrutinized the government’s 
proof and found it severely inadequate in crucial respects. 
Paragraph 1 of the Mobbs Declaration states that Mr. Mobbs is a Special 
Adviser to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Mobbs Decl. at 1. The 
declaration does not indicate what authority a ‘Special Advisor’ has regarding 
classification decisions of enemy combatants.  Indeed, the declaration does not 
indicate whether Mr. Mobbs was appointed by the President, is an officer of 
the United States, is a member of the military, or even a paid employee of the 
government.  During the August 13, 2002, hearing, when asked to explain Mr. 
Mobbs’ authority and role in Hamdi’s classification as an enemy combatant, 
the Respondents’ counsel was unable to do so.  Tr. at 10.  In a general way, the 
declaration never refers to Hamdi as an ‘illegal’ enemy combatant.  The term is 
used constantly in Respondents' Memorandum.  Nor is there anything in the 
declaration about intelligence or the gathering of intelligence from Hamdi.  
There is a huge amount of this in legal arguments.  There is nothing to indicate 
why he is treated differently than all the other captured Taliban.  There is no 
reason given for Hamdi to be in solitary confinement, incommunicado for over 
four months and being held for some eight to ten months without any charges 
of any kind.  This is clearly an unreasonable length of time to be held in order 
to bring criminal charges.  So obviously criminal charges are not contem-
plated. 
Id. at 533. 
87 Id. at 532. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 533.  The district court also considered whether the Geneva Treaty of the Joint 
Services Regulations required a different process.  Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 528. 
93 Id. at 535. 
94 Id.  A number of judges share District Judge Doumar’s view that the type of review 
the executive advocates amounts to a rubber-stamp of its enemy combatant designation.  
See e.g. Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5 (“Unless the courts are now to become rubber-
stamps for executive overreaching, the government’s position must be rejected.”) 
(emphasis added); Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 373 (“the record provides no credible evidence 
supporting the Executive’s designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant,” and that the 
panel’s “rubberstamp of the Executive’s unsupported designation lacks both the 
procedural and substantive content of such review.”) (emphasis added). 
95 Hamdi, 316 F. 3d at 473. 
96 Id. at 462. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 464. 
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99 Id. at 476. 
100 Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335, 343. 
101 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 473-74. 
104 Id. at 474. 
105 Id. at 465. 
106 Id. at 473. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 368. 
112 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281. 





118 Id. at 572. 
119 James Risen & Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: The Investigation: U.S. Says it Halted 
Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y.TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A1.  On June 11, 
2002, during a trip to Moscow, Attorney General Ashcroft proclaimed publicly that the 
U.S. captured “a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a 
radiological dispersion device, or ‘dirty bomb,’ in the United States.”  According to 
Ashcroft, the government obtained information regarding Jose Padilla from Al Qaeda 
lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah who “did not identify Mr. Padilla by name, but provided 
enough information to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to check with other 
sources.”  Id.  According to reports, much of the intelligence information Abu Zubayadah 
has provided government officials has been discredited.  Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, 
Threats and Responses: The Suspect; Questioning to be Legal, Humane and Aggressive, 
The White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A13 . 
 When questioned at a press briefing on June 11, 2002, in Doha, Qatar, Secretary 
Rumsfeld stated that Padilla was “an individual who unquestionably was involved in 
terrorist activities against the United States.”  Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 
News Briefing Re: Media availability at the Emiri Diwan, Qatar (June 11, 2002), at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06112002_t0611edq.html.   
 Despite Ashcroft and Rumsfeld’s initial assertions that Padilla is a terrorist who was 
involved in a terrorist plot against the United States, later government reports 
contradicted Ashcroft and Rumsfeld’s statements.  Only two days following the 
executive’s designation of Padilla as an enemy combatant, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense stated that “[t]here was not an actual plan. . . . We stopped this man in the initial 
planning stages” and the “extent of the actual bomb plot amounted only to ‘some fairly 
loose talk.’”  Susan Schmidt & Kamran Khan, Lawmakers Questions CIA on Dirty Bomb 
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Suspect: Administration Officials Wonder if Ashcroft Was Unduly Alarmist in Arrest 
Announcement,” WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A11.  Presently, the government has yet 
to charge Padilla with wrongdoing and claims that it is holding him primarily for 
interrogation purposes.  Padilla, 243 F.Supp. 2d at 49-50. 
120 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See Unclassified Mobbs Decl., supra note 35. 
124 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 11, 2002) No. 
2:02cv439. 
125 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 576. 
126 Id. at 578. 
127 Id. at 578–79. 
128 Id. 
129 Respondent’s Response, supra note 65, at 5-6. 
130 Although the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi held that the public defender could not act as 
Hamdi’s next friend because he did not have a significant relationship with Hamdi, Judge 
Mukasey explained that Hamdi was distinguishable.  The government seized Hamdi in 
Afghanistan and, upon learning that he was an American citizen, transferred him to a 
military base in Norfolk, Virginia.  Thus, Hamdi never had the opportunity to meet his 
public defender, Frank Durham, and establish a “significant relationship” with him.  
Furthermore, Hamdi’s father was available to act as his next friend.  In contrast, Padilla 
did meet with Donna Newman for a significant period while they were challenging 
Padilla’s initial detention as a material witness.  As a result, she had established a 
“significant relationship” with Padilla and did have standing to file the habeas petition on 
his behalf.  Id. at 576. 
131 Id. at 578. 
132 Id. at 581-82. 
133 Id. at 587. 
134 The court focused heavily on a passage that distinguished the treatment of lawful 
combatants from unlawful combatants: “[like lawful combatants], [u]nlawful combatants 
are . . . subject to capture and detention but in addition they are subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals”  Id. at 594-95.  However, rather than conceding that 
Quirin, at a minimum, requires unlawful combatants to be charged and tried in military 
tribunals, the district court construed the passage to mean that the executive can 
unilaterally designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and detain him without 
access to counsel, trial and judicial review. 
I read the quoted sentence to mean that as between detention alone, and trial by 
a military tribunal with exposure to the penalty actually meted out to 
petitioners in Quirin—death—or, at the least, exposure to a sentence of 
imprisonment intended to punish and deter, the Court regarded detention 
alone, with the sole aim of preventing the detainee from rejoining hostile 
forces—a consequence visited upon captured lawful combatants—as certainly 
lesser of the consequences an unlawful combatant could face.  If, as seems 
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obvious, the Court in fact regarded detention alone as a lesser consequence, 
then our case is a fortiori from Quirin as regards the lawfulness of detention 
under the law of war. 
Id. 
135 In justifying its failure to meaningfully review the executive’s enemy combatant 
designation of Padilla, Judge Mukasey explained, 
The order [under review] arises in the context of foreign relations and national 
security, where a court’s deference to the political branches of national 
government is considerable.  It is the President who wields ‘delicate, plenary 
and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for 
its exercise an act of Congress.’. . .This deference extends to military 
designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active hostilities, 
as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle. 
Id. at 605. 
136 Id. at 607. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 608 (quoting Justice Jackson in Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 
(1981), “we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our 
consequences.”). 
139 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246. 
140 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 23. (“[T]he Executive proposes a form of review that 
would completely eviscerate the independent role of Article III courts in our 
constitutional structure.”) 
141 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
142 Id. 
143 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(B). 
144 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600. 
145 Id. at 600-01. 
146 Id. at 608. 
147 See supra Section III(B). 
148 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 23. 
149 See Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). 
150 Id. at 456 (there is “some evidence” to support a factual determination when “the 
record is not so devoid of evidence that the . . . findings [are] without support or 
otherwise arbitrary”). 
151 Id. at 455. 
152 Id. 
153 See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720–21 (7th Cir. 1996); Viens v. Daniels, 871 
F.2d 1328, 1335 (7th Cir. 1989). 
154 Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (“[Padilla] is entitled to present evidence considered 
alongside the Mobbs Declaration, and to have that evidence considered alongside the 
Mobbs Declaration.”). 
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155 See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact of 
the Celotex Triology, 12 UNIV. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
156 Id. 
157 Although there have been rare instances where petitioners have prevailed under the 
some evidence standard, coupled with Judge Mukasey’s limited access to counsel ruling, 
the court predetermined the executive in Padilla would win.  See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 
U.S. 135, 151, 155–56 (1945) (deportation order could not be sustained under some 
evidence standard when attorney general’s decision rested on unsworn statements by 
cooperating witness who denied making them); Goff v. Burton, 91F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (informant’s testimony did not meet even minimal standards); Meeks, 81 F.3d 
at 720-21 (urine test showing drug use insufficient under ‘some evidence’ standard when 
it bore incorrect prisoner number and inmate established there was more than one person 
with his name at the institution). 
158 Respondent-Appellant’s Brief, Padilla v. Bush, at 47 (2d  Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2235) 
[hereinafter Respondent Brief].  The Executive advocated that courts defer to the 
President and conduct no factual inquiry into Padilla’s detention: 
In view of the great deference owed the President’s determination that Padilla 
is an enemy combatant and the serious separation-of-powers concerns that 
would attend any searching inquiry into the factual underpinnings of the 
President’s judgment, a factual review of the President’s determination can 
extend no further than ensuring that it has some evidentiary support. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
159 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 24. 
160 Id. at 4 (contending “the type of judicial review the executive suggests would be a 
sham process.”).  Padilla cannot meaningfully rebut the executive’s evidence against him, 
since he cannot conduct discovery or challenge the credibility of the Mobbs Declaration 
through cross-examination.  According to prominent retired federal judges, 
the Executive proposes a form of review that would completely eviscerate the 
independent role of Article III courts in our constitutional structure.  The 
court’s role would be reduced to a rubber-stamp, with the sole criteria for 
review being whether the government has managed to draft and file an 
affidavit that was not, on its face, wholly implausible.  So long as the affidavit 
was provided, the court would be barred from hearing the prisoner’s side of the 
story. 
Id. at 31. 
161 Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (motion for reconsideration granted). 
162 In granting the motion for reconsideration, the district court indicated that the 
Executive’s untimely filing was a sanctionable offense.  Id. at 48–49. 
163 Id. at 43–44. 
Because the government’s motion was filed more than a month after the 
Opinion, and includes an affidavit without the benefit of court order, and 
because of the casuistry the government has employed in an effort to justify its 
disregard of the cited rule, there is need to review both the briefing that 
preceded the Opinion, and the procedural steps that followed it. 
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164 Id. at 43. 
165 Id. at 44 (“Appended to the government’s memorandum in support of the motion is the 
declaration of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, 
sworn to January 9, 2003 (‘Jacoby Declaration’), supplemented . . . by a sealed version 
containing additional details (the ‘Sealed Jacoby Declaration’).”).  Id. at 46. 
166 Id. at 47. 
167 Id. at 46. 
168 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 19. 
Indeed, the Executive’s desire to create a “sense of dependency” and 
hopelessness in Padilla by depriving him of all procedural protections is 
nothing more than a modern version of the Star Chamber. . . . The Executive 
contends that its intelligence-gathering needs justify departure from these time-
tested principles.  Invoking the term “enemy combatant,” the Executive asks 
this court to place its imprimatur on practices that brazenly disregard the 
protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  But prisoners brought before the 
Star Chamber and accused of plotting against the King also had valuable 
intelligence information.  Throughout history, totalitarian regimes have 
attempted to justify their acts by designating individuals as “enemies of the 
state” who were unworthy of any legal rights or protections.  These tactics are 
no less despicable, and perhaps even more so, when they occur in a country 
that purports to be governed by the rule of law. 
Id. at 19–20.  (emphasis added). 
169 In addressing the Jacoby Declaration, Judge Mukasey contended that the assertions 
were speculative: 
[I]t is important to recognize that that forecast is speculative—as is clear from 
repeated use of such words as ‘might’ and ‘could.’ . . . Moreover, the forecast 
speculates not about an intelligence-related matter in which Admiral Jacoby is 
expert, but about matters of human nature—Padilla’s in particular—in which, 
most respectfully, there are no true experts. 
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
170 Judge Mukasey explained that 
both the Jacoby Declaration and the Sealed Jacoby Declaration are silent on 
the following two subjects: (i) the particulars of Padilla’s actual interrogation 
thus far, and what they suggest about the prospect of obtaining additional 
information from him, and (ii) when, if at all, intelligence personnel have ever 
experienced effects of an interruption in interrogation like the effects predicted 
in both of the excerpts from the Jacoby Declaration. . . . 
Id. at 50-51. 
171 Id. at 54. 
172 Respondent Brief, supra note 158, at 48 (“The some evidence standard suitably 
addresses that concern by looking solely to the evidence before the Executive at the time 
of the challenged determination.”) (emphasis added). 
173 Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
174 Id. 
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177 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5. 
In the Executive’s view, an Article III court’s role is limited solely to 
ascertaining whether the government has submitted an ex parte affidavit that 
not facially incredible; so long as the government complies with this pro forma 
requirement, the court cannot even ask to hear the prisoner’s side of the case. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
178 In response to Admiral Jacoby’s argument that access to counsel would afford Padilla 
hope and cause him not to cooperate with interrogators, Judge Mukasey explained that 
allowing Padilla access might alert him to the hopelessness of his situation under the 
some evidence standard: 
nowhere does Admiral Jacoby discuss the possibility that if Padilla consulted 
with counsel, made whatever submission he was inclined to make, if any, and 
lost in short order, as he well might under a “some evidence” standard, the 
assured hopelessness of his situation would quickly become apparent to him. 
Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (2003) (emphasis added). 
179 “It is a paradox of the government’s own making that what prevents Padilla from 
becoming aware of the possibility that his avenues of appeal could be swiftly foreclosed 
is that he is not permitted to consult with a lawyer.”  Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
180 Id. at 56. 
181 Id.  
182 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Judge Mukasey’s 
Order Granting Government’s Motion for Interlocutory Appeal). 
183 Id. at 220. 
184 See id. 
185 See supra Section III(B).  Furthermore, if the Second Circuit ruled in Padilla’s favor, 
both Hamdi and Padilla would be ripe for Supreme Court examination because there 
would be conflicting circuit court rulings.  However, were the Fourth Circuit to decide 
both cases in the executive’s favor, there would be no conflicting rulings.  Given the 
Supreme Court’s apparent reluctance to hear cases arising out of the war on terror, the 
Supreme Court could conceivably deny certiorari on both cases, letting the rulings stand 
while Hamdi and Padilla languish in perpetuity.  At a minimum, even if the Supreme 
Court did take Hamdi up on certiorari (cert. petition pending), the executive could 
continue delaying adjudication of Padilla, perhaps even until the Supreme Court ruled in 
Hamdi. 
186 Judge Mukasey writes, 
The government urges that I certify for interlocutory appeal the determination 
that Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman, may act as next friend in pursuing the 
habeas corpus petition that even the government does not deny Padilla may 
file—a ruling that I cannot imagine will be open to serious question—as well 
as the determination that Secretary Rumsfeld is a proper respondent here and 
the ruling that Padilla may confer with his lawyers.  The government does not 
suggest among the issues worthy of certification the core ruling in this 
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proceeding so far—that President Bush has the power to direct the detention of 
an American citizen captured in the United States as an enemy combatant—or 
the court’s determination that the ‘some evidence’ standard will guide the 
decision as to whether that presidential power has been exercised properly or 
not in this case, even though the latter holdings might seem to less partisan 
eyes to present a ‘substantial ground for difference of opinion,’ 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), and at least as worthy of interlocutory review as the issues the 
government has proffered. 
Padilla, 256 F. Supp. 2d  at 221. 
187 Id. at 223.  In addition, on its motion for reconsideration the executive suggested that 
the court grant Padilla’s requested preliminary injunction allowing Padilla access to 
counsel to promote judicial economy.  The district court maintained the executive’s after-
the-fact suggestion was strategically meant to assure the executive immediate appeal to 
the Second Circuit, particularly in the event that either the district court or Second Circuit 
did not grant the discretionary interlocutory appeal: “Although the government has 
suggested that issuance of an injunction might ‘promote judicial economy,’ that 
suggestion invites an order that can have no certain effect other than to assure that the 
government can appeal. . . .”  Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
188  On November 17, 2003, a three member panel of the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals heard oral arguments in Padilla.  Two of the judges sharply interrogated 
government lawyers regarding the executive’s policy on enemy combatants.  Judge 
Rosemary S. Pooler questioned the government’s position that Congress had intended to 
grant the executive such extraordinary powers: “If, in fact, the battlefield is in the United 
States, I think Congress has to say that, and I don’t think they have yet,” adding that “as 
terrible as September 11 was, it didn’t repeal the Constitution.”  Judge Barrington D. 
Parker opined that “[w]ere we to construe the Constitution as permitting this kind of 
power in the executive with only modest judicial review, we would be effecting a sea 
change in the constitutional life of this country and making changes that would be 
unprecedented in civilized society.”  Michelle Garcia, Appeals Court Weighs Case of 
Enemy Combatant: Judge Questions Executive Branch Powers in Patriot Act, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at A3.  The third member of the panel, Judge Richard C. Wesley, 
seemed to side with the government on the jurisdictional issue suggesting that the case 
should not have been brought in New York: “This should be litigated in South Carolina,” 
where Padilla is incarcerated.  Larry Neumeister, Court to Rule on ‘Enemy Combatant’ 
Label, COMMERCIAL. APPEAL, Nov. 18, 2003, at A4. 
 On December 18, 2003, in 2-1 decision the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
absent explicit congressional authorization, the executive lacks the power under Article II 
of the Constitution to detain American citizens as enemy combatants captured on U.S. 
soil outside a zone of combat.  Padilla v. Rumseld, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616 at 5 
(2nd Cir. Dec. 18, 2003).  The court also concluded 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (the 
“Non-Detention Act”) requires explicit congressional authorization and that Congress’ 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (“Joint Resolution”) was not such an authorization.  Id.  The court held that 
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the Southern District of New York did have jurisdiction to hear the case and that 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the proper respondent.  Id. 
 The court, however, did not express an opinion on whether the executive had the 
power to detain as an enemy combatant an American citizen captured in a zone of active 
combat like Hamdi.  Id. at 7.  In addition, the court contended that its ruling mooted 
arguments raised by both parties regarding access to counsel, standard of review, and 
burden of proof.  Id.  The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus directing Secretary Rumsfeld to release Padilla from 
military custody within 30 days.  Id.  The court observed that the executive could then 
either transfer Padilla to the proper civilian authorities to be charged as a criminal or hold 
him as a material witness in connection with grand jury proceedings, with full 
constitutional protections.  Id. 
 Shortly after the ruling, the Department of Justice commented that it would seek a stay 
of the ruling as government lawyers consider whether to appeal to the Second Circuit en 
banc or directly to the Supreme Court.  Scott McClellan, White House spokesman, called 
the ruling “troubling and flawed” and “really inconsistent with the clear constitutional 
authority of the president and his responsibility.”  David Stout, Courts Deal Blow to Bush 
on Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A1.   
189 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5 (“Unless the courts are now to become rubber-
stamps for executive overreaching, the government’s position must be rejected.”) 
(emphasis added).  Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 341 (“[T]he record provides no credible evidence 
supporting the Executive’s designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant” and that the 
panel’s “rubberstamp of the Executive’s unsupported designation lacks both the 
procedural and substantive content of such review.”) (emphasis added).  See Hamdi, 243 
F. Supp. 2d at 535.  (Opining that by accepting the Mobbs Declaration at face value, the 
court would be “abdicating any semblance of the most minimal level of judicial 
review...acting as little more than a rubber stamp.”) (emphasis added). 
190 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 8 (noting that the existence of war or generally exigent 
circumstances, of themselves, do not abrogate the Court’s role in assuring constitutional 
guarantees); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649–50 (1942) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a 
Jurisprudence of Civl liberties In Times of Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11 (1988). 
191 See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 79; United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); 
N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
192 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981) (advocating a 
“process” view of the judiciary’s role in guarding the liberties of “discrete and insular 
minorities”). 
193 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124 (opining during times of commotion, when “the passions of 
men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened,” constitutional liberties “need and 
should receive, the watchful care of those instrusted [sic] with the guardianship of the 
Constitution and laws”–the courts). 
194 See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. 1406. 
195 See id.; ELY, supra note 192; Edward Keynes, Democracy, Judicial Review and War 
Powers, 8 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 69, 75 (1981) (“since a basic objective of American 
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constitutionalism is to advance the individuals freedom or liberty, judicial review can 
serve to protect individuals and minorities against repressive and intemperate 
majorities.”); see generally United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 
(1938) (calling for a “more searching judicial inquiry” of majoritarian political processes 
that disadvantage “discrete and insular minorities” who have minimal access to political 
power). 
196 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224-25 (noting the adage that the war power of the 
government ‘is the power to wage war successfully,’ suggesting that courts should refrain 
from scrutinizing government exercises of its war powers) (Frankfuter, J., concurring); 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (“The case arises in the context of 
Congress’ authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other 
areas has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.”). 
197 Id.; see Green v. Spock, 249 U.S. 47 (1976) (upholding military ban on civilian 
political speech on open public sidewalks on military bases); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 
(1981) (upholding secretary of state’s power to revoke passports of citizens deemed 
threats to national security). 
198 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65. 
199 Melchero v. Federal Open Market Committee, 836 F.2d 651, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(under a checks and balances constitutional scheme, the courts should not resolve “issues 
that are appropriately left to the [elective] legislative arena”). 
200 Finona Doherty et al., A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties since Sept. 11,  
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, at 1. 
201 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Fred Korematsu, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696 (4th 
Cir. Oct. 7, 2003) (describing executive national security abuses of civil liberties under 
the 1798 Sedition Act, the 1917 Espionage Act, the 1919-20 Palmer Raids, the 1942 
Japanese American Internment, and the 1950s McCarthyism and the Smith Act); see also 
David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terror, 38 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
202 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 79 (scrutinizing and then rejecting President Truman’s 
contention that in the prosecution of the Korean War, national security required 
government seizure of steel mills embroiled in a labor dispute). 
203 Id. 
204 See generally WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING 
WAR TIME (1998). 
205 See, e.g., Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564; N. Jersey Media Group, 
308 F.3d 198. 
206 See generally Yamamoto, supra note 20; Saito, supra note 4; Letti Volpp, The Citizen 
As Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1575 (2002); PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 
16; Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335.  Comparing Hamdi to Korematsu, Judge Motz reminded the 
panel that the High Court’s earlier deference to the executive’s DeWitt Report, also 
prepared by military officials, upheld Fred Korematsu’s conviction for remaining in his 
home.  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit based its ruling in Hamdi solely on the Mobbs 
Declaration.  Echoing Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu, Judge Motz warned that 
when the executive “oversteps the bound[s] of constitutionality . . . it is an incident,” but 
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when a court “review[s] and approve[s], that passing incident becomes doctrine.”  Id. at 
375. 
207 Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 41–43. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 42.  
211 See supra Section II(A). 
212 See e.g., Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564; American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (S.D.Cal. 2003) (challenging 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s special registration procedures targeting 
primarily Arab and Muslim non-citizen males for registration); Center for Nat’l Sec. 
Studies v. United States Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (arguing for 
release of September 11 detainee names); Muslim Community Ass’n of Ann Arbor et al. 
v. Ashcroft, Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Civil Action No. 03-72913 
(E.D.Mi. July 7, 2003), available at http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/ 
mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf. (ACLU suit on behalf on Arab American challenging 
constitutionality of the PATRIOT Act); Electronic Privacy Info. Center v. Office of 
Homeland Security, Civ. Action No. 02-620 (CKK) (Dec. 26, 2002) (on file with author). 
(challenging the prohibition of Freedom of Information Act disclosures); Benevolence 
Int’l Foundation v. John Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D.Ill. 2002) (challenging the 
government’s seizure of Illinois charity proceeds while the government investigates 
whether organization has ties to terrorism); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 02-CV-02307-JG 
(E.D.N.Y 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/turkmenash 
41702cmp.pdf (alleging Arab and Muslim men detained after the September 11 attacks 
were abused in prisons); United States of America v. Osama Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 
55, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (alleging Arab and Muslim men detained after the September 11 
attacks were abused in prisons); N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198 (challenging 
government’s blanket closing of deportation proceedings of September 11 detainees); 
Detroit Free Press, 308 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (challenging government’s blanket 
closing of deportation proceedings of September 11 detainees); Al Odah v. United States, 
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging indefinite detention of Guantanamo Bay 
prisoners); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (challenging 
indefinite detention of Guantanamo Bay prisoners); M.K.B. v. Warden, No. 03-6747 
(S.Ct. filed July 1, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/ 
mkbwarden62703cpet.pdf (challenging how far courts can go to seal all legal filings and 
the entire docket in a federal habeas corpus case, without issuing any findings in support 
of sealing the file). 
213 See e.g. Gibbons Brief, supra note 10; ABA Brief, supra note 70; Neal R. Sonnett et 
al., Preliminary Report, A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE TREATMENT OF ENEMY 
COMBATANTS (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy_combat-
ants.pdf.; Hamdi, 337 F.3d 335 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
214 In Korematsu, the Court gave near absolute deference to the executive’s military 
necessity claims despite its pronouncement of strict scrutiny.  See generally Eric K. 
Yamamoto & Susan Kiyomi Serrano, The Loaded Weapon, 28 AMERASIA 51 (2002).  
 
194 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LIBERTIES POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
 
215 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 11. 
216 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564; Detroit Free Press, 308 F.3d 
681; N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198. 
217 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 (“The government thus submits that we may not review at all 
its designation of an American citizen as an enemy combatant—that its determinations on 
this score are the first and final word.”); Respondents’ Response, supra note 65, at 13 
(“[W]hether Padilla at some future time may be charged with violating domestic criminal 
law (or the laws of war) has no bearing on whether he is presently an enemy combatant 
subject to detention during wartime). 
218 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01. 
219 Id. 
220 See supra Section III. 
221 Id. 
222 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 24. 
223 Courts are competent to assess the effects of government actions in assessing their 
validity.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
224 Suggesting that as a matter of law, the executive does not have the power to 
unilaterally designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and detain him 
indefinitely absent fundamental liberties, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) explicitly states, “No 
citizen shall be . . . detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”  
Furthermore, the historic purpose of the writ of habeas was to prevent executive detention 
of citizens absent judicial review.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953).  During times of national threat, the Constitution 
through the Suspension Clause allows suspension of habeas.  However, the Suspension 
clause resides in Article I.  Accordingly, only Congress, not the Executive, can suspend 
judicial scrutiny of executive detention.  Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 7; U.S. Const. 
Art. I, § 9 cl. 2; Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.Md. 1861); Ex parte 
Bollman, 8. U.S. 75, 101 (1807). 
225  In assessing whether the means are appropriately tailored, courts can examine what 
procedures and standards would govern the executive’s enemy combatant designation of 
American citizens and ensure that the individual can contest his detention through habeas 
proceedings and that he has full access to counsel.  Sonnett, supra note 213, at 21–24. 
226 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 27–28. 
Amici submit that the Constitution requires at least clear and convincing 
evidence before a person may be held in custody for an extended or indefinite 
period of time, as the Executive has already imposed here … Moreover, to the 
extent that a detention is punitive in nature—as detention of ‘unlawful 
combatants’ arguably may be—the Constitution requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Id. 
227 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2003).  The law permits detention of a material witness only to 
guarantee his testimony in a criminal proceeding and only if the government can show he 
is a flight risk or his testimony can be obtained only through detention.  Material 
 
Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 195 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003 
 
witnesses are not criminal suspects and, therefore, their detention should not exceed the 
time necessary to secure their depositions. 
228 Doherty, supra note 200 at 16; See also Edward Alden & Caroline Daniel, Battle 
Lines Blurred as U.S. Searches for Enemies in the War on Terrorism: LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY: Technology Provides the Means, September 11 the Justification. FINANCIAL 
TIMES (London), January 2, 2003, at 11; Editorial, A Lesson Learned from Evansville, 
BALT. SUN, June 22, 2003, at 4C. 
229 See Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55; In re Application of the United States for a 
Material Witness, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13234 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002). 
230 The government has used preventative detention as a strategy for fighting its war on 
terror.  The theory appeared to be that detention, based primarily on race, religion and 
ethnicity, would prevent those detained from proving to be a threat—an “arrest and detain 
first, ask questions later” approach.  Doherty, supra note 200, at 14.  Employing the term 
“suspected terrorist,” the Attorney General explained, 
We will arrest and detain any suspected terrorist who has violated the law.  If 
suspects are found not to have links to terrorism or not to have violated the 
law, they’ll be released.  But terrorists who are in violation of the law will be 
convicted, in some cases be deported, and in all cases be prevented from doing 
further harm to Americans. 
Department of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Outlines Foreign Terrorist Tracking 
Task Force, Oct. 31, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/ 
agcrisisremarks10_31.htm. 
231 Id. 
232 UNITED STATES: PRESUMPTION OF GUILT, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 16 (2002), 
available at  http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf. 
233 Doherty, supra note 200, at 18. 
234 Id. 
According to lawyers representing a number of detainees, it is now common 
for the INS to fail to charge individuals within the prescribed 48 hours.  The 
bipartisan effort in Congress to include in the USA PATRIOT Act a seven-day 
charge requirement to curb abuse of new government powers has been 
completely ineffectual. Current practice under INS regulations involves 
detention without charge not only for a week, but for months. 
Id. 
235  Doherty, supra note 200, at 14–15. 
236  As Human Rights Watch reported, “the detainees were interrogated as if they were 
accused criminals in conditions that were punitive in nature.”  Id. at 16. 
237  According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights report, 
[I]n United States of America v. Osama Awadallah [202 F. Supp. 2d 55 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)], the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for 
potential testimony before a grand jury was rule unlawful.  Awadallah is a 
lawful permanent resident in the United States and was held in solitary 
confinement in the maximum-security wing . . . for 20 days, based solely on 
the material witness warrant.  The government made several misrepresen-
 
196 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LIBERTIES POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
 
tations and omissions in order to get an arrest warrant and during the time 
Awadallah was imprisoned, the government failed to take steps to secure his 
deposition.  In ordering his release, Judge Shira Scheindlin said that “since 
1789, no Congress has granted the government the authority to imprison an 
innocent person in order to guarantee that he will testify before a grand jury 
conducting a criminal investigation. 
Doherty, supra note 200, at 16; But see In re the Application of the United States, 2002 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 13234 (upholding material witness detentions for grand jury testimony). 
238 See generally Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681; North Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198. 
239 According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “lawyers for detainees 
subject to these measures believe that a secrecy order casts suspicion on their clients 
which may affect their client’s ability to get a fair hearing.”  Doherty, supra note 200, at 
20.  Similarly, the government in Korematsu presumed Japanese Americans were 
disloyal based on their race and denied them individualized hearings to determine 
disloyalty.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
240 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. 
241 Detroit Free Press, 3030 F.3d at 702. 
242 The district court in N. Jersey Media applied the executive’s method and reviewed the 
blanket closing under rational basis.  N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d 198.  The district court in 
Detroit Free Press, however, rejected the executive’s approach and reviewed the blanket 
closing under strict scrutiny.  Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 608. 
243 Id. at 709–10 (emphasis added) (“the government seeks to protect from disclosure the 
bits and pieces of information that seem innocuous in isolation, but when pieced together 
with other bits and pieces aid in creating a bigger picture of the Government’s anti-
terrorism investigation, i.e., ‘the mosaic intelligence’”).  Id. 
244 See Yamamoto, supra note 20. 
245 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 5-11. 
246 See supra Section IV(B).   
247 See supra Section IV. 
248 Id. 
249 Gibbons Brief, supra note 10, at 28 (“Recognizing this [constitutional] safeguard need 
not damage national security, so long as courts carefully tailor their proceedings to the 
needs of the situations as they are fully capable of doing.”); Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 375 
(“The Department of Defense has already compiled and collected [the records Mr. Mobbs 
relied upon in making his determinations].  Producing them for judicial review, ex parte 
and in camera if necessary would not in any way hamper the Executive’s ability to wage 
war.”) (Motz, J., dissenting). 
250Milligan, 71 U.S. at 20. 
251 Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 375. 
But one need not refer back to the time of the Framers to understand that 
courts must be vigilant in guarding Constitutional freedoms, perhaps never 
more so than in time of war.  We must not forget the lesson of Korematsu, a 
case in which the Supreme Court sanctioned the military internment of 
thousands of American citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II.  In 
 
Judicial Scrutiny of National Security 197 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003 
 
its deference to an Executive report that, like the Mobbs declaration, was filed 
by a member of the Executive associated with the military and which 
purported to explain the Executive’s actions, the Court upheld the conviction 
of Korematsu for simply remaining in his home, in violation of the military 
internment order. 
Id. 
252 See supra Section IV(B)(2). 
253 See supra Section IV(A)(1). 
254 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564. 
255 See supra Section IV(A)(2). 
256 See McGirk, supra note 35.  
257 Only two days following the executive’s designation of Padilla as an enemy 
combatant, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that “[t]here was not an actual plan. . . 
We stopped this man in the initial planning stages” and the “extent of the actual bomb 
plot amounted only to ‘some fairly loose talk.’”  Susan Schmidt & Kamran Khan, 
Lawmakers Questions CIA on Dirty Bomb Suspect: Administration Officials Wonder if 
Ashcroft Was Unduly Alarmist in Arrest Announcement,” WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at 
A11. 
258 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 477. 
259 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710. 
260 Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (quoting Robel, 389 U.S. 258 at 264.  See also Detroit 
Free Press, 303 F.3d at 709–10 (“there seems to be no limit to the Government’s 
argument. . . . The Government could operate in virtual secrecy in all matters dealing, 
even remotely, with “national security,” resulting in a wholesale suspension of 
[fundamental] rights.  By the simple assertion of “national security,” the Government 
seeks a process where it may, without review . . . deprive [Americans] of their 
fundamental liberties.”). 
261 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 12. 
262 Id. at 8. 
263 Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 375 (“[A]nd so in answer to the question certified to us—
‘[w]hether the Mobbs Declaration, standing alone, is sufficient as a matter of law to allow 
meaningful judicial review of Yasser Esam Hamdi’s classification as an enemy 
combatant?’—the answer must be ‘No.’”) (Motz, J., dissenting). 
264 Yamamoto, supra note 20, at 48. 
265 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124 (opining during times of commotion, when “the passions of 
men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened,” constitutional liberties need and 
should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted [sic] with the guardianship of the 
Constitution and laws”—the courts). 
266 Sonnett, supra note 213, at 20. 
267 Id. at 21. 
268 Id. at 22. 
269 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
